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ABSTRACT 
Security modeling is the foundation to formal verification which is a core 
requirement for high assurance systems.  This thesis explores how security models can be 
built in a simple and expressive manner using the Metaslang specification language in 
Specware.  The models are subsequently translated, via the Specware to Isabelle Interface, 
to be proven for correctness in Isabelle which is a generic, interactive theorem proving 
environment.    It is found that the translation between Specware and Isabelle is almost 
seamless and there is much potential in the use of Isabelle/HOL to discharge proof 
obligations that arise in developing Specware specifications, although the actual proving 
requires substantial knowledge and experience in logical calculus.   
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Developing a high assurance system requires the building of a security model that 
is verified using formal methods.  Theorem provers and model checkers are some of the 
formal method’s tools that help to build specifications for a security model and 
mathematically verify their correctness.  
Former NPS students have explored various formal specification tools such as 
PVS [1], Specware [2] and Alloy [3] for their usefulness in formally specifying a security 
model to represent security policies and verify their correctness. 
In this thesis we are revisiting Specware, an “automated software development 
system” [4] by Kestrel institute. It exploits category theory to capture the refinement of 
specifications into code and the composition of software components. In DeCloss’s thesis 
[2], it is mentioned that the Snark automated theorem prover bundled with Specware “is 
deficient in multiple ways including insufficient logging capabilities” [2].  
Specware has since included a translator to translate a Specware specification to 
an Isabelle Specification. Isabelle is a generic proof assistant that “allows mathematical 
formulas to be expressed in a formal language and provides tools for proving those 
formulas in a logical calculus” [5]. We are demonstrating in this thesis that a 
specification in Specware can be translated to Isabelle using the tool. We will explore, 
though not in-depth, some proving capabilities of Isabelle.  A number of simple proofs 
will be demonstrated in this thesis. 
State changes are common in most security models. We are exploring the use of a 
recursive function and Monad to represent state changes. Monad was mentioned in 
DeCloss’s Thesis [2] as future work and we will explore and demonstrate how state 
changes can be represented using State Monad. 
This thesis presents our encounter and experience with security modeling using 
the latest version of Specware and auto-proving with Isabelle and our follow-up work on 
Decloss’s Thesis.  We begin by first presenting a brief overview of Specware, its 
specification language MetaSlang and Isabelle.  We then describe our approach in 
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learning the concepts of security modeling and modeling and discuss the intermediate and 
final models we built.  We then conclude with our analysis of Specware and Isabelle, and 




A. FORMAL METHODS, MODELS AND VERIFICATION 
Formal methods are, as described by Wing [6], mathematically based techniques 
to describe system properties.  A method is formal if it has a sound mathematical basis, 
and this provides the means to precisely define notions like consistency and 
completeness; and more relevantly, specification, implementation and correctness, 
typically using a formal specification language.  Formal method provides the means to 
prove properties of a system without necessarily running it to determine its behaviour, 
that a specification is realizable and that a system has been implemented correctly.  
A formal model is one constructed from requirements and informal rules and 
policies on the system.  It is a precise and unambiguous statement of a system’s security 
policy.  For example, for a security model, mapping is performed to map a security policy 
to a mathematical model.  It is then informally argued that the model is consistent with 
the security policy.  If the model is an accurate restatement of the policy and if the model 
is self consistent, we can conclude that the policy is self consistent. 
A formal specification refers to the specification for a created formal 
mathematical model (Formal Model).  It is a precise definition of what the software is 
intended to do [7]. It differs from conventional design specifications in that it is 
concerned only with the function of the system and makes no commitments to its 
structure.  In particular, a formal security policy model is concerned with the security of 
the system.  A specification is abstract and specifies what is to be done instead of how it 
is done.  It specifies only whatever level of detail is necessary, leaving unsaid what is 
deemed unimportant. A specification is central to a project, and proofs of the 
specification’s properties are at least as useful as proofs of correct implementation.  The 
formal specifications are proven to satisfy the mathematical model.   
Formal methods can be employed in any stage of system development, from 
requirement specification to design, implementation, testing, and maintenance right up to 
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verification and evaluation, although cost and return of value may differ for each stage. It 
is useful in unravelling ambiguity, incompleteness and inconsistency in the system, 
increasing the correctness of the system.  Applying formal methods can benefit many 
areas in addition to security, including fitness for purpose, maintainability, ease of 
construction, and better visibility [8].  
Most formal methods have not been applied to specifying large scale software or 
hardware systems. Hence, most are still inadequate to specify many important 
behavioural constraints beyond functionality (e.g., fault tolerance, real-time performance 
and human factors).  There is also a general lack of integration between formal methods 
with the entire system development effort.   
The application of formal methods is still very much restricted to the academic 
and military fields.  Although it is not all about complicated mathematics, it requires a 
paradigm shift from normal software engineering.  Depending on the support tools 
chosen, the learning curve is not trivial and experience is critical to develop a good 
formal specification.  Proper training is required for formal methods practitioners.  The 
success of a formal method application is very much dependent on the quality of the 
practitioners [8]. 
Formal methods could be broadly categorised into three groups: refutation, 
verification and intensive mathematical study of key programs, each with its own 
strengths, weaknesses and costs [8]. 
In refutation, as is employed in the Alloy Aanlyser, one tries to refute the claim 
that the specification meets its requirements by searching for counterexamples.  It is 
based on the small scope hypothesis which states that if an inconsistency in a model 
exists there is a high probability that it will present itself within a small scope of the 
model. The finding of counterexamples is not “absolute proving” in the strictest sense, 
although the finding of one counterexample is enough to conclude that a particular 
system is insecure. Often, model checking may be slow as it runs extensively in the 
searching of counterexamples. 
 5
Verification attempts to provide a basis by which software can be proved to be a 
correct realization of its specification. Typically, this is only carried out at the 
requirements and code level as performance of formal methods drive up the cost 
significantly.  To reduce cost, the intensive mathematical study of the key programs 
approach focuses only on the difficult and problematic part.  This, however, carries the 
danger that something of security relevance might be overlooked unless the security 
functions have been factored into a small number of underlying components. Automated 
verification systems or theorem provers would be useful in formal verfication, as they can 
greatly increase the efficiency and productivity.  The general complaint, though, is that 
they are time consuming to use, costly, and to date they are limited in their ability to be 
fully automated.  Most require an untrival level of guidance from the human operator to 
complete the proofs.  Successful verification, though, will give users the assurance that 
the software will work and behave as specified, which is crucial in security and safety 
critical software. 
The Common Criteria imposes the requirement that any system requiring a high 
level of trust (e.g., Evaluation Assurance Level 7 or EAL 7) must undergo a rigours life 
cycle including the use of formal verification of its security properties [9]. Formal 
verification is incorporated in the development life cycle to ensure that the system is 
correct.  While necessary for high assurance systems, the level of effort associated with 
manual verification can be unreasonably huge due to large and complicated proofs. 
In the context of the project, a specification language and verification system 
developed by the Kestrel Development Corporation is used.  We attempt to build upon 
the work perivously performed by DeCloss, and to evaluate the usability of the newer 
features of Specware, the discharging of proof obligations directly to Isabelle for proving 
via the Specware Isabelle interface, and the modeling of the Least Privileged Seperation 
Kernel using Monads and inbuilt Set base library in Specware. 
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B. INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS 
1. Bell and LaPadula (BLP) 
The concept of mandatory access controls was formalized by Bell and LaPadula 
in a model commonly bearing their name [10].  Numerous variations of the model have 
since been published, but only a very simplified version will be considered in the context 
of this paper for the building of a sample security model using Specware. 
Mandatory access control policy is based on security labels attached to subjects 
and objects.  A label on a user and an object are called security clearance and a security 
classification respectively.  A user labeled secret can run the same program as a subject 
labeled secret or as a subject labeled unclassified, assuming the program is labeled 
unclassed. Even though both the subjects run the same program on behalf of the same 
user, they obtain different privileges due to their security labels.  For the purpose of the 
example in this thesis, only the notion of subject and object will be considered.   
Mandatory access BLP rules can be expressed as follows, with SecLabel 
representing the security label of the indicated subject or object: 
• Simple security property: Subject s can read object o only if SecLabel(s) 
dominates SecLabel(o). 
• *-property: Subject s can write object o only if SecLabel(o) dominates 
SecLabel(s). 
2. Least Privilege Separation Kernels (LPSK) 
The separation kernels concept was introduced in 1981 by Rushby [11]. A 
separation kernel divides all the resources into blocks, sometimes called “partitions.” The 
actions of an active resource in one block are isolated from another active resource in 
another block, unless a communication is explicitly defined [12]. The common 
application of the separation kernels concept includes Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM), 
process isolation, enforcing avionic-related policies, and security policies [12]. A 
separation kernel where resources are allocated to blocks in a fixed manner is called a 
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static separation kernel and is desirable for simplicity of design [3]. The Principle of 
Least Privilege [13] is fulfilled by granting only the least set of privilege to an active 
resource in LPSK.  
Part of this thesis attempts to implement a security model based on “A Least 
Privilege Model for Statics Separation Kernels” [12] published by The Center for 
Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS). 
C. SECURITY MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
The thesis demonstrates different ways in modeling BLP and LPSK using 
Specware and attempts to verify the correctness using Isabelle. State transitions modeled 
using recursive function and state monads are explored. Two types of proofing 
approaches, apply-style proof and structured Isar proof, in Isabelle are also explored. 
 8
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III. OVERVIEW OF SPECWARE AND ISABELLE 
A. SPECWARE DESCRIPTION 
Specware is a tool used for building and manipulating a collection of related 
specifications.  It is a design tool, a logic tool, a programming language, and at the same 
time a database storing and manipulating collections of concepts, facts and relationships.  
It can be used to develop domain theories, develop code from specifications, and also for 
reverse engineering to derive a specification from existing code [14].  It uses notions and 
procedures based on category theory and related mathematics to manipulate 
specifications [15]. 
Composition and refinement are the core techniques of application building in 
Specware.  Complex specifications can be composed from simpler ones and concrete 
specifications may be refined from abstract ones.  Through refinement, a more specific 
case of a model is built [17].    
Specware is designed with the idea that large and complex problems can be 
specified by combining small and simple specifications.  The problem specifications may 
be further refined into a working system by the controlled stepwise introduction of 
implementation design decisions, in such a way that the refined specifications and 
ultimately the working code is a provably correct refinement of the original problem 
specification [14]. 
There are three major objectives in the design of Specware.  First, it seeks to 
provide a way to express requirements as formal specifications, independent of the 
ultimate implementation or target language.  Users can then focus on correctness, which 
is crucial to the reliability of the system.  Second, it keeps the problem analysis process 
separated from the implementation process.  Implementation choices can be introduced 
piecewise, making backtracking and alternative exploration possible.  Third, it allows the 
articulation of software requirements, making of implementation choices and generation 
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of provably correct code in a formally verifiable manner, facilitating system maintenance 
and adaption of specifications to new or changed requirements. 
Specware interfaces with and performs logical inference and proving using 
external theorem provers like SRI’s SNARK theorem prover and Isabelle.  External 
provers are connected to Specware through logic morphisms, which relate logic to each 
other. SNARK is an automatic theorem prover that is difficult for allowing users to verify 
the proof as it provides insufficient logging capabilities [2]. Isabelle is an interactive 
theorem prover that provides more feedbacks to the user. 
The version of Specware used for the project is 4.2.2. An unofficial release of 
Specware version 4.2.5 was also used in the later stage of the project which supports Set 
and has additional support for Monads. 
B. SPECWARE FUNCTIONALITY 
1. MetaSlang 
MetaSlang, based on higher-order logic, is the specification and programming 
language used in Specware.  The Specware Language Manual contains a description and 
(extended) BNF of the grammar of the Metaslang language.  An extracted portion of the 
core grammar is shown here but it is not intended to be comprehensive.  The reader is 
recommended to refer to the Specware documentation for a more complete explanation. 
MetaSlang is essentially a functional language. It includes syntactic constituents 
for describing functional semantics within a specification as well as constructs for 
describing composition, refinement, code generation, and proof capabilities. Specification 
constituents include types, expressions, and axioms which can be used to describe 
domain-specific formalisms [14]. The MetaSlang grammar follows a functional style of 
programming, which is valuable for proving properties regarding functions. 
a. Specs 
“A specification is a finite presentation of a theory in higher-order logic” 
[17]. Specifications, or specs, provide the means to describe abstract concepts of the 
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problem domain, which is the first step in building an application. There are three major 
constituents of specs.  The first is types which describe collections of values.  The second 
component is operations which are functions on these values. The last constituent is 
axioms and definitions which define the actions and properties of types and operations. 
In the design of specifications, a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches may be employed.  The problem domain may be broken down into small, 
manageable parts.  Each part is specified separately allowing one to focus on small, 
individual parts of the problem.  A spec can be extended by importing other specs which 
essentially copies the imported spec into the target spec creating a larger and more 
complex spec.  Specs are also the objects used in morphisms which define the part-of or 
is-a relationship between two specs. Morphisms allow for refinement of specs and 
provide the utility to take simple abstract specifications and refine them to more concrete, 
complex specifications [14]. The general form of a spec definition is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 TrafficSpec = spec 
 
   {body} 




Figure 1 Spec Definition 
b. Types 
A type is a syntactic entity that denotes a set of values.  Types are 
collections or sets of objects and expressions that characterize those objects.  Specware 
provides several inbuilt types in its libraries.  These are imported automatically for every 
spec processed by Specware.  Users can declare new types or build or constitute new 





 %% Define that color can be Red, Yellow or Green 
 type Color = | Red | Yellow | Green 
 
 %% Define that Traffic lights is a color and integer tuple 
 %% The integer acts as a counter to indicate the number of state 
changes 
 type Traffic_Light = Color * Integer 
 
Figure 2 Declaration of Types 
c. Ops and Defs 
An operation, or op in MetaSlang, is a syntactic symbol accompanied by a 
Type.  It is used to describe instantiations of types. An op may be used to declare explicit 
types as well as declare functions performing an operation based on the types given in the 
declaration. Examples of op declarations are show in Figure 3.  An op can be either 
monomorphic or polymorphic, as shown by the examples light_changes and map, 
respecitively.    
 
 %% Example of monomorphic op  
 %% Declaration of light_changes  
 op light_changes : Color -> Color 
 %% Definition of light changes 
 def light_changes (c) = 
  if c = Red 
  then Green 
  else 
   if c = Green 
   then Yellow  
   else Red 
 
 %% Example of polymorphic op in List.sw 
 op map : [a,b] (a -> b) -> List a -> List b  
 def map f l = 
  case l of 
   | []   -> []  
   | hd::tl -> Cons(f hd,map f tl) 
 
Figure 3 Definition of light_changes Operation 
The behavior and constraint of an op may be further quantified with a def 
(definition). An op definition corresponds to a previously declared op and must match the 
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signature of the op declaration. It is possible, and recommended, to combine the op and 
def in one declaration using the construct as show below in Figure 4.  
  
 op light_changes (c: Color) : Color =  
  if c = Read  
  then Green  
  else  
   if c = Green  
   then Yellow  
   else Red 
 
Figure 4 Alternative definition of light_changes 
An op definition may be considered a special notation for an axiom.  It is 
able to express the same logic that an axiom might express; but unlike an axiom which is 
automatically assumed to be true and has no proof obligation, a def may have associated 
proof obligations.  For precision, the use of defs is encouraged over axioms.  
d. Claims: Axioms, Conjectures, and Theorems 
Specware supports the three kinds of claims: axioms, conjectures, and 
theorems.  These are all terms of Boolean type.  While an axiom is assumed to be true 
with no proving obligation, conjectures and theorems are claims that must be proven 
through the use of op definitions and axioms. Specware will automatically generate 
conjectures based on op declarations, but the user can also explicitly create conjectures.  
Specware does not really differentiate explicit conjectures from theorems, and it handles 
them in the same way.  Potentially, issues may arise when Specware interfaces with 
theorem provers which differentiate the two claims.  An example of a theorem definition 
is shown below in Figure 5.  Conjectures and axioms are specified in the same way. 
  
 %% This theorem is trying to verify that 
 %% for all traffic light, light_change equal to next state 
 theorem light_matches is 
  fa(x : Traffic_Light) 
   light_changes(project 1(x)) = (project 1(next_state(x))) 
 
Figure 5 Theorem Definition in Traffic Light Model 
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e. Set and List 
In higher-order logic, it is customary to define a set as a predicate, which 
is true exactly for (i.e., for all and only) the elements of the set.  Support for the Set 
specification is new in Specware version 4.2.5, and documentation on Set is not yet 
available in the Specware Language Manual at the time of this writing.  Unlike List, 
which comes with a number of helper operations to search and manipulate members of 
the List, Set is essentially a predicate which does not allow enumeration of each of its 
members.  From the comment inside the Set specification, it is important to note that Sets 
as defined are useful only for specification purposes and not for execution.   
f. Monads 
The concept of Monads arises from category theory, about which this 
thesis will not go into detail.  A Monad is a kind of abstract data type used to represent 
computations (instead of data in the domain model) in a functional programming 
language where a program is written as a set of equations where the value of an 
expression depends only on its free variables, and not the order of computation.  In this 
context, Monads allows the performance of “impure” sequential operations, including 
exception handling, capturing of state and state transitions, and output handling [18].  Of 
special relevance in the context of the thesis regarding the construction of security 
models is the use of Monads to represent state transitions. 
Programs written in functional style can make use of Monads to structure 
procedures that include sequenced operations or to define arbitrary deterministic control 
flows (like handling concurrency, continuations or exceptions) [18]. Of special relevance 
in the construction of security models is state transition.             
The usual formation of a Monad is known as a Kleisli triple and has the 
following components [18]: 
a. A type constructor M that must fulfill several properties, which make 
possible the composition of functions that the user values from the Monad 
as their arguments (so-called monadic functions).  It defines how the 
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monadic type can be obtained from one or more specific underlying types.  
If M is the name of the Monad and t is a data type, “M t” is the 
corresponding type of the Monad. 
b. A unit function mapping a value in an underlying type to a value in the 
corresponding monadic type.  The function is usually called return and has 
the polymorphic type a→ M a. 
c. A binding operation of polymorphic type M a → (a→M b) → Mb.  The 
first argument is a value in a monadic type, the second is a function which 
maps from the underlying type of the first argument to another monadic 
type, and the result is in that other monadic type.  The binding operation 
contains the logic essential to execute the monadic functions or registered 
callbacks.  In Specware, this function is named monadBind. 
The explanation here is far from complete and will be left as an exercise 
for users to learn more about Monads.  We will leave with some simple explanation of 
the declaration of the Monad shown in Figure 6, which is used in most of our models.  
The type constructor is defined by the first declaration of StateMond a, where 
StateMonad represents the name of the Monad and a is the underlying type.  The unit or 
return function is represented in the next statement and it essentially maps a value of type 
a to StateMonad a.  Lastly, monadBind defines the binding operation and is used 
implicitly rather than explicitly in many Monadic operations in this thesis. 
 
 type StateMonad a = State -> a * State 
 op [a] return (x:a): StateMonad a = fn st -> (x, st) 
 op [a,b] monadBind (m1: StateMonad a, f : a -> StateMonad b): 
 StateMonad b =  
    fn st -> let (y,st1) = m1 st in  
     f y st1 
 
Figure 6 State Monard and accompanying monadic functions 
The Haskell programming language is a functional language that makes 
heavy use of Monads.  The concept of a Monad is not intuitive and is hard to grasp for 
most beginners.  It will not be possible to go into great detail here and readers are advised 
to find out more from the many tutorials available on the web [18, 19].   
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The Specware User Manual contains only a very brief description of 
Monads (Section 2.6.16) without furnishing any concrete example on their usage.  We 
translated a simple Haskell [19] example to Specware to better understand the concept 
and its support in Specware.  Both the Haskell specification and the corresponding 
Specware one can be found in Appendix A.  
2. Specware to Isabelle Translation 
The specification in Specware can be translated to Isabelle Specification using the 
command Ctrl+C TAB in the Specware to Isabelle Interface.  
A Specware definition may translate into one of three different kinds of 
Isabelle definitions: defs, recdefs and primrecs (primitive 
recursions). Simple recursion on coproduct constructors translates to 
primrec, but if the function has multiple arguments, only if the function 
is curried. Other recursion translates to recdef which, in general, 
requires a user-supplied measure function to prove termination. Non-
recursive functions are translated to defs, except in some cases they are 
translated to recdefs which allow more pattern matching [20]. 
Figure 7 shows a sample Specware specification, while Figure 8 shows the 
Isabelle specification translated from the sample Specware specification. 
 
 op transition: State -> State 
 def transition(s) = (succ s.1 , succ s.2) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 op evaluate: Nat -> State 
 def evaluate(n) = if n = 0 then (1,0) else transition(evaluate(n-
1)) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 











consts transition :: "State \<Rightarrow> State" 
defs transition_def [simp]:  
 "transition s \<equiv> (Suc (fst s), Suc (snd s))" 
theorem evaluate_Obligation_subtype:  
 "\<lbrakk>\<not> (n = 0)\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> int n - 1 \<ge> 
0" 
  by auto 
fun evaluate :: "nat \<Rightarrow> State" 
where 
   "evaluate 0 = (1, 0)" 
 | "evaluate (Suc n) = transition (evaluate n)" 
 
Figure 8 Isabelle specification translated from the sample Specware Specification 
3. Basic Specware Operation 
We can invoke the XEmacs with Specware and Isabelle by running the 
“SpecwareIsabelle” executable file located in the /opt/Kertrel/Specware-4-2-2 directory. 
Figure 9 shows a screenshot of the XEmacs interface, where all the commands can be 
found in the menu tabs. Table 1 lists some of the more common XEmacs and Specware 
keyboard commands that were used in the development of this thesis. The documentation 
on using Specware can be found in Specware 4.2 User Manual [21]. 
 








CTRL+x CTRL+F XEmacs command to open a file 
CTRL+x CTRL+S XEmacs command to save a file 
CTRL+x CTRL+c XEmacs command to close XEmacs 
CTRL+c p Specware command to process current file 
CTRL+c TAB Specware command to translate file to Isabelle 
Table 1.   Common XEmacs and Specware commands 
C. ISABELLE PROVING APPROACHES 
1. Apply-style Proofs 
An apply-style proof is an interactive proof in higher-order logic (HOL) using 
Isabelle’s proof assistant [22]. Proofing strategy can be selected using the “apply” 
function in Isabelle. From the theorem, sub-goals are derived and have to be proved.  The 
thesis only lists a few examples of the commands supported under apply-style proofs. 
More comprehensive coverage can be found on Isabelle’s website [23].  
a. apply(auto) 
This command will adopt the proof strategy called auto to try to solve all 
the sub-goals automatically [22]. Figure 10 shows a sample output when Isabelle is able 
to solve the sub-goals. 
 
Figure 10 Example of sub-goals being proven in Isabelle 
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b. apply(induct_tac x) 
This command will apply a proof strategy called induct_tac to perform 
induction to the variable x [22]. Figure 11 shows an example of sub-goals in Isabelle 
before induction is applied, while Figure 12 shows an example of induct_tac being 
applied to the variable n. 
 
Figure 11 Example of sub-goals in Isabelle before induction is applied 
 
 
Figure 12 Example of induct_tac being applied to the variable n 
c. apply(simp add: x1 x2) 
This command will apply a simplification proof strategy by adding x1 and 
x2, which are theory names, as rules for it simplification.  
2. Structured Isar Proofs 
Isar stands for “Intelligiable semi-automated reasoning” and is an extension of the 
apply-style proofs [24]. Figure 13 shows a typical proof skeleton of Isar proofs and 
Figure 14 shows an example of Isar proofs in Isabelle. More comprehensive coverage on 
Isar can be found in the Isabelle/Isar reference manual [24]. 
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Figure 13 Typical proof of skeleton of Isar proofs 
 
Figure 14 Example of Isar proofs in Isabelle 
D. SETUP OF DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT IN FEDORA 8 
We are running Fedora 8 in VMware Workstation on a Windows Vista machine. 
The license for the VMware Workstation and the image for Fedora 8 are obtained from 
the CISR lab. The following software are required in Fedora 8 for the Specware and 
Isabelle development environment: 
• XEmacs version 21.5.28.5 
• Isabelle 2008 version 
• Specware version 4.2.2 
1. XEmacs Version 21.5.28.5 
XEmacs can be installed using the yum command in Fedora. Internet access must 
be available for the Fedora 8 machine before yum can download and install the XEmacs. 
Figure 15 shows the command to install XEmacs. 
 
Figure 15 yum command to install XEmacs 
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2. Isabelle 2008 Version  





Figure 16 shows the installation instruction for Isabelle 2008. 
 
Figure 16 Installation Instruction of Isabelle 2008 [From Ref. [16]] 
3. Specware Version 4.2.2 
Execute ./setuplinux.bin that comes with the Specware version 4.2.2 installation 
package to install the Specware software. Figure 17 shows a possible xcb_xlib error you 
may encounter while installing the Specware version 4.2.2 in Fedora 8. 
 
Figure 17 xcb_xlib error while installing Specware version 4.2.2 in Fedora 8 
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A possible solution to this error is to update the libxcb to version 1.0.4 before 
proceeding with the Specware version 4.2.2 installation. The libxcb can be updated using 
the command “yum update libxcb.” At the time of this writing, version 1.0.4 is not 
available for update in Fedora 8. 
A number of manual configurations are required to get Specware version 4.2.2 to 
run on Fedora 8 platform.  This list of manual configuration is listed in Table 2.   
 
SN Manual configuration Comment 
1 Delete the line “. $HERE/Find_SBCL” from Specware and SpecwareShell in 
/opt/Kestrel/Specware-4-2-2 directory 
2 Delete the following lines from  “XEmacs_Specware” in /opt/Kestrel/Specware-4-2-
2 directory: 
# Try to find lisp executable: 
if [ -z "$LISP" ]; then 
   for L in /Applications/sbcl/bin/sbcl 
/usr/local/bin/sbcl "$HOME"/bin/sbcl /bin/lisp; do 
      if [ -x "$L" ]; then 
         LISP="$L"; break 
      fi 
   done 
fi 
if [ -z "$LISP" ]; then 
   echo "Failed to $act, no LISP executable found" 
2>&1 
   exit 1 
fi 
if [ ! -x "$LISP" ]; then 
   echo "Failed to $act, $LISP is not executable" 
2>&1 
   exit 1 
fi 
SBCL is no longer 
required by Specware 
3 Comment out the line “x-symbol-specware” from 
files.el in /opt/Kestrel/Specware-4-2-
2/Library/IO/Emacs/ 
There is a bug with x-
symbol and the latest 
version of xemacs and x-
symbol is not required to 
run Specware 
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4 Include the path to Isabelle “/usr/local/Isabelle/bin/” 
to the line “Isabelle –p …” in the file 
Isabelle_Specware in /opt/Kestrel/Specware-4-2-2 
directory 
To specify the path to 
Isabelle 
Table 2.   List of Tasks for Specware 4.2.2 to run in Fedora 8 
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IV. SECURITY MODEL 
A. MODELING STRATEGY 
An iterative and incremental approach as shown in Figure 18 was adopted in 
modeling in the project as the team is new to both security modeling and functional 
programming.  After setting up the initial environment, the team built a simple Specware 
specification that models a Traffic Light to get familiarized with Specware as described 
in the next section. Concepts about state and transition are incorporated in the model as a 
preparation for security modeling.  The proof-obligations are subsequently discharged 
and proven using Isabelle.   
The Traffic Light Model was expanded into a BLP*-property model as our first 
attempt on security modeling.  The team was unable to successfully prove this first 
simple model using Isabelle, even when the model is trimmed to the bare minimal and 
trivial theorem is specified for proving.  It is found that some understanding of the 
intrinsic of the theorem proving in Isabelle is essential to guide the proof interactively to 
completion.  The team began the exploration of Monads at this point as an alternative 
representation of the state changes as it is suspected that the construct of the state 
changes, as is currently used in the BLP*-property model, may be overly complex, 
making proving on Isabelle non-trivial.  A simple Specware example was created based 
on a widely available Haskell example, as in Appendix A, to explore the support and use 
of Monads on Specware. 
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Figure 18 Modeling Approach 
As a natural next step, the BLP *-model and the Simple Monad example were 
merged to obtain our first security model specification (BLP Model) with Monad using 
Specware.  This model was used for the discussion and refined during the team’s visit to 
Kestrel.  The Kestrel team attempted a proof of the specification using Isabelle, which is 
documented in more detail later in a later section. After the visit, the BLP Model was 
used as a base specification for a Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK).  
B. SIMPLE TRAFFIC LIGHT MODEL 
Before specifying the security model, the team explored representing traffic light 
state changes in Specware. This Specware specification is subsequently translated into an 
Isabelle specification and proven in Isabelle. 
1. Color Definition 
There are three colors in a traffic light: namely red, yellow, and green. The trivial 
example described here models simply how the color changes in a traffic light system.  
Figure 19 shows a definition of type color in Specware, while Figure 20 shows the 




 %% Define that color can be Red, Yellow or Green 
 type Color = | Red | Yellow | Green 
Figure 19 Type Color definition in Specware 
 
datatype Color = Green 
               | Red 
               | Yellow 
Figure 20 Type Color definition in Isabelle 
2. Op light_changes 
Light changes is defined as an op that transits the current color to the next color. 
Figure 21 shows how the op light_changes is defined in Specware, while Figure 22 
shows the translated specification in Isabelle. 
 
 
 %% Define light_changes function 
 %% The function will return the next color 
 %% based on the inputed color 
 op light_changes : Color -> Color 
 def light_changes (c) = 
  if c = Red then Green else 
if c = Green then Yellow else Red 
 
Figure 21 Light changes definition in Specware 
 
 
consts light_changes :: "Color \<Rightarrow> Color" 
defs light_changes_def:  
  "light_changes c 
     \<equiv> (if c = Red then  
          Green 
        else  
          if c = Green then Yellow else Red)" 
 
Figure 22 Light changes definition in Isabelle 
3. Traffic Light as a List of Colors 
The traffic light can be modeled as a color sequence (represented in a list) with 
transition occurring from each sequence element to the next. Figure 23 shows how this 
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transition is defined.  To test out proving on Isabelle, a trivial theorem was formulated. 
Two axioms are defined and used in the proving of the theorem.  
 
 
 %% define traffic light as a list 
 type Traffic_Light = List Color 
 
 %% Axiom to state traffic light list is not empty and  
 %% traffic light list starts with Yellow 
 axiom a0 is 
  fa(x : Traffic_Light)  
   ~(null x) && (hd x = Yellow) 
 
 %% Axiom to state the state changes in the traffic light list 
 axiom a2 is 
  fa(x : Traffic_Light, y : Integer)  
   (if y>=0 && y < (length x -1) then (* y is valid index *) 
    nth(x, y+1)= light_changes(nth(x, y)) 
   else 
    true) 
 
 %% This Theorem states that 
 %% for all traffic light lists with any number of state changes 
 %% the sequence of light changes is correct 
 theorem light_matches is 
  (fa(x : Traffic_Light, y: Integer) 
   ((y >= 0 && y < length x - 1) => light_changes (nth(x,y)) = 
     nth(x,y+1))) 
 proof Isa [simp] 
  using a0 a2 
  apply(auto) 
 end-proof 
 
Figure 23 Specware specification representing the transition from color to color in 
list and a trivial theorem 
The Specware specification can be translated to Isabelle specification by issuing 
the CTRL+C TAB command in Specware specification window. Figure 24 shows the 







types Traffic_Light = "Color list" 
consts light_changes :: "Color \<Rightarrow> Color" 
defs light_changes_def:  
  "light_changes c 
     \<equiv> (if c = Red then  
          Green 
        else  
          if c = Green then Yellow else Red)" 
axioms a0:  
  "\<not> (null x) \<and> hd x = Yellow" 
theorem a2_Obligation_subtype:  
  "\<lbrakk>(y::int) \<ge> 0; y < int (length x) - 1\<rbrakk> 
\<Longrightarrow> y + 1 \<ge> 0" 
  by auto 
theorem a2_Obligation_subtype0:  
  "\<lbrakk>(y::int) \<ge> 0;  
    y < int (length x) - 1;  
    y + 1 \<ge> 0\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> y + 1 < int (length x)" 
  by auto 
theorem a2_Obligation_subtype1:  
  "\<lbrakk>(y::int) < int (length x) - 1; y \<ge> 0\<rbrakk> 
\<Longrightarrow>  
   y < int (length x)" 
  by auto 
axioms a2:  
  "if y \<ge> 0 \<and> y < int (length x) - 1 then  
     x ! nat (y + 1) = light_changes (x ! nat y) 
   else  
     True" 
theorem light_matches [simp]:  
  "\<lbrakk>y \<ge> 0; y < int (length x) - 1\<rbrakk> 
\<Longrightarrow>  
   light_changes (x ! nat y) = x ! nat (y + 1)" 
      using a0 a2 
      apply(auto) 
  done 
 
Figure 24 Translated Isabelle specification for transition from color to color in list 
and the trivial theorem 
Proving can be done in Isabelle by using the Retract, Undo, Next, Use or Goto 
commands as shown in Figure 25. The Retract command will undo all the proof steps and 
return to the beginning of the Specification. The Undo command will undo the current 
statement. The Next command will “execute” the current statement. The Use command 
will execute all the statements till the end of the specification, and the Goto command 
will execute up to the current statement. Figure 26 shows an example of a  
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counterexample found before axioms are being applied. After the axioms are applied in 
the proof, Isabelle was only left with one subgoal to prove as shown in Figure 27. Figure 
28 shows the end result of the proof of the theorem. 
 
 
Figure 25 Screenshot of Isabelle command menu 
 
 
Figure 26 A counter example is found by Isabelle before using the two axioms 
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Figure 27 After the two axioms are applied, Isabelle only need to prove one subgoal 
 
Proof: The theorem light_matches is proved using apply(auto) 
 
Figure 28 Isabelle proof for theorem light_matches for traffic light represented using 
list of color 
4. Traffic Light as a State Tuple 
The traffic light can alternatively be modeled as a tuple representing the current 
state.  Each tuple is comprised of a color and a counter indicating the number of 
transitions which have occurred from initialization. Figure 29 shows how this state 
change transition is represented in Specware. The op next_state defines the state 
transition, the op run_traffic executes the state transition the inputted number of steps,  
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and the theorem light_matches is formulated just as a simple illustration of the use of 




 %% Define that Traffic light is a color and integer tuple 
 %% The integer act as a counter to indicate the number  
 %% of state changes 
 type Traffic_Light = Color * Integer 
 
 %% Define next_state function 
 %% This basically is representing a state transition process 
 %% where the light will transit to the next light and 
 %% the counter will increment by one 
 op next_state : Traffic_Light -> Traffic_Light 
 def next_state(x) = (light_changes(project 1(x)),((project 
2(x))+1)) 
 
 %% Define run_traffic function 
 %% This function will execute the inputed natural number 
 %% count of state transition 
 op run_traffic : Nat -> Traffic_Light 
 def run_traffic(n) = if n <= 0 then (Yellow,0) else 
   next_state(run_traffic(n-1)) 
 
 %% This theorem is trying to verify that 
 %% for all traffic light, light_change is equal to next state 
 theorem light_matches is 
  fa(x : Traffic_Light) 
   light_changes(project 1(x)) = (project 1(next_state(x))) 
 proof Isa 
  apply(simp add: light_changes_def next_state_def) 
 end-proof 
 

















types Traffic_Light = "Color \<times> int" 
consts light_changes :: "Color \<Rightarrow> Color" 
defs light_changes_def:  
  "light_changes c 
     \<equiv> (if c = Red then  
          Green 
        else  
          if c = Green then Yellow else Red)" 
consts next_state :: "Traffic_Light \<Rightarrow> Traffic_Light" 
defs next_state_def:  
  "next_state x \<equiv> (light_changes (fst x), snd x + 1)" 
theorem run_traffic_Obligation_subsort:  
  "\<lbrakk>\<not> (n \<le> 0)\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> int n - 1 
\<ge> 0" 
  by auto 
consts run_traffic :: "nat \<Rightarrow> Traffic_Light" 
recdef run_traffic "measure size" 
  "run_traffic n 
     = (if n \<le> 0 then  
          (Yellow, 0) 
        else  
          next_state (run_traffic (n - 1)))" 
theorem light_matches:  
  "light_changes (fst x) = fst (next_state x)" 
    apply(simp add: light_changes_def next_state_def) 
  done 
 
Figure 30 Translated Isabelle specification for the traffic light modeled as a tuple of 
color and the number of state changes 
5. Discussion and Lessons Learned 
The state tuple provides a concise way of representing state and tracking changes.  
The two representations are, however, observed to have similar effects and the List model 
is adopted in the subsequent Simple BLP *-property example to harness the inbuilt 
support of Specware for List for easy manipulation of its elements.  The traffic light 
model shows the team’s first attempt at modeling the notion of a state which essentially is 
the color of the light and the state change function.  A simple theorem labelled 
light_change has been formulated as an illustration.  Its proof obligation is discharged for 
proving in Isabelle via the Specware to the Isabelle Interface and proven successfully.  
The translation looks simple but in fact took substantial effort as the team was new to 
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Specware, Isabelle and also to the Specware to Isabelle Interface.  Whenever a problem 
was encountered in the proofing of the outputted Isabelle specification, it was not easy to 
determine if the problem lies in our model or in the Isabelle-Specware translation.  For 
example, a few of the problems were related to the use of the Nat and Int types due to the 
additional obligations generated for the former type.  As the team worked with the model 
and proofiing, we realized increasingly that a working knowledge of theorem provers and 
Isabelle would be needed to guide the proof and troubleshoot any problem that may arise 
due to the translation.  Having got a first taste of Specware and Isabelle, the team 
proceeded to build the first security model to model BLP *-property in Specware. 
C. MODELING BLP *-PROPERTY IN SPECWARE 
1. Model Description 
We are creating a security model based on the Security Domain Model [25]. This 
model consists of two inputs, a memory and a list of program statements as shown in 
Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31 Computer system block diagram 
The high inputs represent input with high label, while the low input represent 
input with low label. The label of the variable takes the label of the source, which can be  
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high input, low input, another variable, or a constant (low label). The types of statements 
supported in this model are read, write and assign. The security property the model is 
checking is *-property  (no write down) of BLP. 
2. Specware Model 
The Specware model is being broken down into the following Specware 
Specifications: 
• TypeDefSpec.sw – the specification file where all the required type 
definitions is located. 
• MemorySpec.sw – the specification file where all the functions that 
manipulate the memory state (variable, high input, and low input) is 
located. 
• StatementSpec.sw – the specification where all the functions that 
FileSystemSpec.sw required to execute the statement (assign, read, and 
write). 
• InitSpec – the specification where the initial state of the system is being 
defined. 
• FileSystemSpec.sw – the main specification of the model, which includes 
the state transition, property check and the theorem. 
a. Type Definition (TypeDefSpec.sw) 
All the required type declarations by the model are placed in the 
TypeDefSpec.sw. For easy readability, some initial types are declared as shown in Figure 
32. 
 
 %% Initial type declaration 
 type Name = String 
 type Value = Integer 
 type Index = Nat 
 type ProgCounter = Nat 
 
Figure 32 Initial type declaration 
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The label is declared as high or low as shown in Figure 33. 
 
 type Label = | High | Low 
 
Figure 33 Label type declaration 
Variables are declared as a list of tuples as shown in Figure 34. The tuple 
consists of Name, Value, and Label. 
 
 %% Variable declaration 
 type Variable = Name * Value * Label 
 
 type Variables = List Variable 
 
Figure 34 Variables type declaration 
Input is declared as a tuple as shown in Figure 35. The tuple consists of a 
list of values and an index. The index will indicate the next value to be read from the 
input list.  
 
 %% Input declaration 
 type Input = (List Value) * Index 
 
Figure 35 Input type declaration 
Types of statements that are supported in this model include ReadLow, 
ReadHigh, WriteLow, WriteHigh, Assign1, Assign2, and Stop as shown in Figure 36.  
Assign is being represented by Assign1 and Assign2, where Assign1 represents assigning 
a variable to another variable, and Assign2 represents assigning a constant to a variable. 
 
 %% Statement declaration 
 %% assign1 - variable name = variable name, eg a = b 
 %% assign2 - variable name = value, eg a = 5 
 type TypeOfStmt = | ReadLow | ReadHigh | WriteLow | WriteHigh | 
          Assign1 | Assign2  | Stop 
 
Figure 36 Type of statement type declaration 
 37
A Statement is being declared as a tuple as shown in Figure 37.  Initially, 
the team intended to represent the statement with six elements, but the Specware 
translator only allowed the maximum of five elements in a tuple. Therefore, we created 
an extra tuple called NextProgCounter in Stmt. The first ProgCounter indicates the index 
of the next statement to execute, and the second ProgCounter is reserved for future 
implementation of if-then-else statements. Sample code on how if-then-else statements 
can be included in the model is available as part of Appendix B. 
 
 %% Left-hand part 
 type LHP = Name 
 
 %% Right-hand part 
 type RHP = | VarName String | VarValue Integer  
 
 %% used to indicate the index for next statement to execute 
 %% normally first ProgCounter is used. 
 %% but when conditional statement like if-then-else is used 
 %% the first ProgCounter is for positive evaluation in if and 
 %% the second ProgCounter is for the negative evaluation in else 
 type NextProgCounter = ProgCounter * ProgCounter 
 
 %% Statement definition 
 type Stmt = Name * TypeOfStmt * LHP * RHP * NextProgCounter 
 
Figure 37 Statement type declaration 
Finally, the Program, Memory State, and the SystemState are declared as 
shown in Figure 38. 
 
 %% Program declaration 
 type Program = (List Stmt) * ProgCounter 
 
 %% Memory State declaration- Variables, Low Input, High Input 
 type MemoryState = Variables * Input * Input 
 
 %% System state declaration - Variable, Low Input, High Input, 
Program 
 type SystemState = Variables * Input * Input * Program 
 
Figure 38 Program, Memory State, and System State type declaration 
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b. Memory Manipulation (MemorySpec.sw) 
All the functions to manipulate the memory state of the model are located 
in the MemorySpec.sw. These functions include read_low, read_high, find_variable, and 
update_variable. They are used by functions in StatementSpec.sw. 
The read_low definition will read the next input from low input, increase 
the index of low input, and return the new memory state and the read value from low 
input. The definition is shown in Figure 39. 
 
 %% Read from the low input list based on the current index 
 %% Increment Index 
 %% Returns the value read 
 op read_low : MemoryState -> MemoryStateValueTuple 
 def read_low (mem_state) = 
  let read_value = read_inputLow(mem_state) in 
   let updated_input_stream =  
    (mem_state.2.1, succ(mem_state.2.2)) in 
     let updated_memory =  
      (mem_state.1, updated_input_stream, mem_state.3) in
       (updated_memory, read_value) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 39 op read_low definition 
The read_high definition is similar to read_low definition except that it 
will read from the high input and return the value from high input. 
The find_variable definition will find the variable from the variable list 
and return the variable tuple. The return type is Option Variable, which mean that it will 
return the tuple if it is found, if not “None” will be returned. Figure 40 shows the op 
find_variable definition. 
 
 %% Find the variable from the variable list  
 %% based on variable name and return the variable 
 op find_variable : Name * MemoryState -> Option Variable 
 def find_variable(var_name, mem_state) = 
  find (fn i -> compare(var_name, i.1) = Equal) (mem_state.1) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 40 op find_variable definition 
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The update_variable definition updates the variable according to the 
parameter passed in to the definition. Figure 41 shows the op update_variable definition. 
 
 %% Update the varibale with the new value 
 op update_variable : Name * Value * Label * MemoryState ->  
   MemoryState 
 def update_variable(var_name, var_value, var_Label, mem_state) = 
  let new_var = insert((var_name, var_value, var_Label),  
   filter (fn i -> compare(var_name, i.1) ~= Equal)  
   (mem_state.1)) in 
    (new_var, mem_state.2, mem_state.3)  
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 41 op update_variable definition 
c. Support Functions for Statement Execution (StatementSpec.sw) 
All the support functions for statement execution are located in 
StatemaentSpec.sw. These include read_low_func, read_high_func, assign1_func, 
assign2_func, and get_var_value.  They are used by the FileSystemSpec.sw. 
The read_low_func function calls the read_low from MemorySpec.sw to 
read a value from low input and updates the read value into the specified variable 
together with a Low label (indicating that the value is from low input). Figure 42 shows 
the definition of read_low_func. 
 
 %% function to read from low input and assign to variable  
 %% specified by LHP 
 op read_low_func : LHP * MemoryState -> MemoryState 
 def read_low_func (var_name, mem_state) = 
  let read_value = (read_low(mem_state)).2 in 
   update_variable(var_name, read_value, Low, mem_state) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 42 op read_low_func definition 
The read_high_func definition is similar to the read_low_func except that 
it is reading from high input, and hence the label is High. 
The assign1_func definition uses the case method to extract the variable 
name from RHP as shown in Figure 43 and calls find_variable in MemorySpec.sw to get 
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the variable tuple stated by the RHP. If the variable is in the variable list, the keyword 
“Some” can be used to retrieve the tuple and update the variable using update_variable in 
MemorySpec.sw. “None” indicates that the variable was not found and the definition will 
just return the current memory state.  
 
 %% function to assign a value of a variable to a variable (LHP) 
 op assign1_func : LHP * RHP * MemoryState -> MemoryState 
 def assign1_func(l, r, mem_state) = 
  %% find out the value of the variable specified by RHP 
  %% then assign the value to LHP,  
  %% if not variable not found - just do nothing 
   case r of 
    | VarName v -> 
     let x = find_variable(v,mem_state) in 
      case x of  
       | Some var -> update_variable (l, var.2, var.3,  
                  mem_state) 
       | None -> mem_state 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 43 op assign1_func definition 
The assign2_func definition uses the case method to extract the value from 
RHP as shown in Figure 44 and updates the variable using update_variable in 
MemorySpec.sw accordingly. 
 
 %% function to assign an integer (RHP) to a variable (LHP) 
 op assign2_func : LHP * RHP * MemoryState -> MemoryState 
 def assign2_func(l, r, mem_state) = 
  %% assign the value from RHP to LHP, 
  case r of 
   | VarValue v -> 
   update_variable (l, v, Low, mem_state) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 44 op assign2_func definition 
The get_var_value definition uses the find_variable in MemorySpec.sw to 
get the value of the variable; if the variable is not found, zero will be returned. Figure 45 





 %% function to get value from variable name,  
 %% if variable not found, zero will be returned by default 
 op get_var_value : Name * MemoryState -> Value 
 def get_var_value(n,mem_state) = 
  let x = find_variable(n, mem_state) in 
   case x of  
    | Some v -> v.2 
    %%  default to 0 if not found 
    | None -> 0 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 45 op get_var_value definition 
d. Initialize Specification (InitSpec.sw) 
The initialize specification contains the initial_state definition which can 
be replaced subsequently by any program pseudo code of the same syntax. Figure 46 
shows the sample initial_state definition used in this thesis. 
 
 op initial_state :  SystemState 
 def initial_state : SystemState =  
  %% init Variable 
  ([("x",0, Low), ("y",0, Low)], 
  %% init low input 
  ([2,7,18],0), 
  %% init high input 
  ([4,10,35],0), 
  %% init program 
  ([("s0", Assign2,   "x", VarValue 5,  (1, 1)),  
   ("s1", ReadLow,   "y", VarValue 0,  (2, 2)), 
   ("s2", Assign1,   "x", VarName "y", (3, 3)), 
   ("s3", ReadHigh,  "y", VarValue 0,  (4, 4)), 
   ("s4", WriteHigh, "y", VarValue 0,  (5, 5)), 
   ("s5", WriteHigh, "x", VarValue 0,  (6, 6)), 
    ("s6", Stop,      "" , VarValue 0,  (6, 6))], 
    0)) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 46 Sample op initial_state definition 
e. Main Specification (FileSystemSpec.sw) 
The main specification of the model contains the definition state transition, 
property checks and the theorems. Figure 47 shows part of the transition definition, the 
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full definition is available in the Appendix B. The transition definition will go to the 
statement specified by the ProgCounter and, based on the TypeOfStmt, execute the 
different if-then-else branches. After executing the statement, transition will return the 
next system state. WriteLow and WriteHigh statements are handled in the transition, but 
since there is no output in this model, it will just transit to the next state. 
 
 %% system state transition 
 op transition : SystemState -> SystemState 
 def transition (s) =  
  %% as nth will be used, it is required to confirm the length  
  %% of the list before proceeding, else Isabelle 
  if (length s.4.1) > s.4.2 then 
   let vars = s.1 in 
   let inputLow = s.2 in 
   let inputHigh = s.3 in 
   let prog = s.4 in  
   let stmt = nth (prog.1, prog.2) in 
    %% Handle read low statement 
    if stmt.2 = ReadLow then 
     %% Read from low input and assign to variable  
     %% specified by LHS 
     let new_mem = read_low_func(stmt.3, (vars, inputLow,  
               inputHigh)) in 
     %% Update prog state - assign next program counter 
     let new_prog =  (prog.1, stmt.5.1) in 
      (new_mem.1, new_mem.2, new_mem.3, new_prog) 
 
   ................ 
 
  %% by defualt return the current state for unknown statement 
  else s 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 47 Partial op transition definition 
The BLP *-property is defined in the property definition shown in Figure 
48.  Only if the statement is doing a WriteLow and the label of the variable to be written 







 %% check the system state for writing high to low (BLP *-property) 
 op property? : SystemState -> Boolean 
 def property?(s) =  
  %% as nth will be used, it is required to confirm the length  
  %% of the list before proceeding, else Isabelle 
  if ((length s.4.1) > s.4.2) then 
   let stmt = nth(s.4.1,s.4.2) b 
    %% will return false only if the statement is writelow 
    %% and the label of the  variable is high 
    if (stmt.2 = WriteLow) && 
      (exists(fn i -> ((i.1 = stmt.3) &&  
      (i.3 = High))) (s.1)) then 
     false 
    else 
     true 
  else  
   true 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 48 op property definition 
The evaluate definition is a recursive function which initializes the system 
state and does a number of transitions depending on the input nature number. Figure 49 
shows the definition of evaluate. 
 
 %% This function will run n number of line of the program 
 %% The function is of recursive nature, where it will recursively 
 %% call itself until n = 0, and the systemstate will be 
 %% iniitalize to the initial state, subsequently transition 
 %% will happen until the initial n value 
 op evaluate : Nat -> SystemState  
 def evaluate(n) =  
  if n = 0 then  
   initial_state  
  else  
   transition(evaluate(n-1)) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
Figure 49 op evaluate definition 
The system_secure theorem shown in Figure 50 verifies whether or not the 
program loaded through the initial_state in InitSpec.sw violates the BLP *-property 




theorem using Isabelle, as it requires an in-depth understanding of the intrinsic of the 
Isabelle theorem proofing process. In its place we created a theorem shown in Figure 51 
to illustrate the proving of a trivial theorem in Isabelle. 
 
 %% This theorem is evaluate whether the input program is 
secure 
 theorem system_secure is 
  fa(n : Nat) 
   property?(evaluate(n)) 
 %% This proof could not be complete in Isabelle 
 %% It require an more in depth understanding of 
 %% Isabelle 
 proof Isa [simp] 
  apply(induct_tac n) 
  apply(auto simp add: Let_def) 
 end-proof 
 
Figure 50 theorem system_secure definition 
 
 %% This function checks whether the program counter  
 %% is greater than 0 
 op pcProperty? : SystemState -> Boolean 
 def pcProperty?(s) =  
  if ((length s.4.1) > 0) then 
   true 
  else 
   false  
 proof Isa  [simp]  end-proof 
 
 %% This trivial theorem will confirm that Prog counter  
 %% will remain greater than 0 
 theorem pc_ok is 
  fa(n : Nat) 
   pcProperty?(evaluate(n)) 
 proof Isa [simp] 
  apply(induct_tac n) 
  apply(auto simp add: Let_def)  
 end-proof 
 
Figure 51 op pcProperty and theorem pc_ok definition 
3. Discussion and Lessons Learned 
Many valuable lessons on the use of Specware and Isabelle were learned in the 
process of building this model.  We learned that instead of using the simp add command 
in Isabelle, we can add proof Isa [simp] end-proof at the end of each op definition. This 
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will instruct Isabelle to add the op definition after it is being proved to the list of 
simplification rules, which can be used for proofing of other op definition or theorem. All 
the codes listed in Figure 39 through Figure 51 used this proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
approach. Figure 52 shows an example of theorem pc_ok definition using simp add 
command. The pcProperty? predicate is converted to to pcProperty_p_def, where ? is 
converted to _p and _def is added to all op during the translation by Specware. 
 theorem pc_ok is 
  fa(n : Nat) 
   pcProperty?(evaluate(n)) 
 proof Isa [simp] 
  apply(induct_tac n) 
  apply(auto simp add: Let_def pcProperty_p_def evaluate_def)  
 end-proof 
 
Figure 52 Example of theorem pc_ok using  simp_add command 
If we want to translate the Specware specification to the Isabelle specification, the 
maximum number of elements allowed in any tuple (type product) is five. Specware has 
added this restriction by design since by having too many elements in the tuple, the 
specification may become unreadable. Kestrel recommended the use of a record type 
instead of the tuple.  This is one of a few undocumented facts about the Specware to 
Isabelle Interface that the team encountered and valuable time was spent in 
troubleshooting just to isolate the problem.  It was particularly painful that no error was 
generated during the translation process.  
Problems may be faced in proving of the translated Isabelle specification if we 
were to use “+” or “-” to increase or decrease a natural number. The correct way is to use 
a built-in function in Metaslang like succ or pred for the increment or decrement of a 
natural number.  
The use of the “case of ” construct in a Specware specification may sometimes 
result in a translated Isabelle Specification which is harder to prove. When this happens, 
it is always recommended to use the if-then-else construct instead. 
In summary, the team discovered more “undocumented” features in Specware and 
Isabelle, such as the ceiling limitation of the number of elements supported in a Specware 
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type-product type.  The security model was built and the proof was discharged to Isabelle. 
It was found that the proof could not be completed automatically using the simp and auto 
rules although very trivial theorems were constructed.  Posts were made to the Isabelle 
user group but no response was obtained.  It was not easy to discern if the problem arises 
due to inherent inadequacies in the model, the translation performed by the Specware 
Isabelle Interface or just technicalities and know-how of guiding Isabelle in its proof.  
With limited time and resources, it was decided that a trip would be made to Kestrel to 
seek first-hand technical advice on the model.   
D. LESSONS LEARNED AT THE KESTREL INSTITUTE 
The visit to the Kestrel Institute was made with the following objectives: 
• to seek advice and guidance in proving using Isabelle 
• to clear doubts on the interface between Specware and Isabelle 
• to reconfirm our modeling approach and to verify the correctness in our 
use of the newer and not well documented features of Specware 
The initial version of the BLP specification described in the next section was used for the 
purpose of discussion.   
1. Specware Model 
A walk-through of the specification was first done with Dr. Coglio Alessandro 
and Dr. Stephen Westfold from Kestrel.  Improvements suggested are as follows: 
• Use of Type-records in place of Type-products.  Type-records are 
essentially similar to type-products except that the components, called 
“fields,” are identified by name instead of by position.  The ordering of the 
“filed-typers” has no significance.  This makes the specification clearer 
and more readable.  An example to illustrate the use of both types is 





 %% Definition using Type-product 
 type Resource = ResourceName * SecLabel 
 %% Example 
 op label: Resource -> SecLabel  
 def label (resrc) = resrc.2 
 %% Alternative way of representing def function 
 % def label(name, lab) = lab 
  
Figure 53 Illustrated use of Type-product 
  
 %% Definition using Type-record 
 type Resource = {name: ResourceName, label: SecLabel} 
 op label: Resource -> SecLabel 
 def label (resrc) = resrc.label 
 
Figure 54 Illustrated use of Type-record 
• Use of Set instead of List.  The team has always pondered the lack of the 
support for Set in the Specware Inbuilt and Base Library.  It was only 
understood during the visit that the Set specification is not released and 
will only be available from Specware version 4.2.5.   Set predicates are 
available for use with the use of Set, as can be shown in the BLP example.  
The State, originally represented as a List and manipulated by List 
operators, is amended to be represented in Sets.  The resultant 
specification looks much more concise and cleaner, but it is later found 
that the Sets, being represented as predicates, lack the useful manipulators 
available in Lists.   
• Use of pattern matching.  Although not explicitly and extensively 
documented, pattern matching is a strength in the Specware language and 
the Kestrel team recommended its use.  It is important to note, though, that 
its use results in terse expressions, which though concise, may not be as 
readable to consumers of the specification. 
2. Use of Monads 
The team verified with Specware the correct and apt use of Monad in our BLP 
example. While questioning the relevancy of Monad use for such a simple example, the 
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Kestrel team affirmed that our use is appropriate and it correctly encapsulates the 
sequenced operations and imperative code inside the transition operation.  The use of 
Monad, though, does not make subsequent proofing easier.  It only performs a certain 
state of encapsulation and bookkeeping.  It is further verified that Exception Monads may 
not be directly applicable and useful for our simple model.   
3. General Proving Strategy 
The Kestrel team offered some general advice on our specification to facilitate 
proofing.  First, it is recommended that the types and operations must be defined in 
sequence, as they are used.  Isabelle, unlike Specware, does not tolerate the usage of 
types and operations which have not been defined at the point where they are used.  
Secondly, as a general guideline, it is always good to decompose functions into smaller, 
intermediate functions as doing so frequently makes proving more direct and easier.  
Proofs of the sub parts can then be used to compose proofs of composing types.  Thirdly, 
the Kestrel team cautioned the overuse of axioms as they may not be totally consistent 
with one another.  This retards rather than facilitates proving.   
4. Proving Using Isabelle 
The Kestrel team attempted the proving of the BLP specification using Isabelle.  
The team observed that although the theorem looks trivial, the proof requires extensive 
knowledge and experience in logical calculus and Isabelle.  Isabelle is a powerful 
interactive theorem prover but has a substantial learning curve.  The proof is done 
interactively on Isabelle and the result is copied back into the original Specware 
specification.  The final specification and the corresponding proof will be shown and 
discussed in the next section.   
Overall, it was a fruitful visit and a great learning experience.  The authors regret 
that the visit was not performed in an earlier stage of the research.  A lot more could be 
learned from the staff at Kestrel to supplement the inadequacies in the team’s technical 
knowledge and skills and the lack of access to Specware examples.  
 49
E. MODELING BLP IN SPECWARE 
1. Model Description 
The concept of mandatory access controls was formalized by Bell and LaPadula 
in a model commonly bearing their name [10].  Numerous variations of the model have 
since been published but only a very simplified version will be considered in the context 
of this paper, for the building of a sample security model using Specware. 
Mandatory access control policy for confidentiality1 is based on security labels 
attached to subjects and objects. Subjects represent the entire entities of a computer 
system, such as processes. A label on a user is called security clearance and a label on a 
subject or object is called a security classification.  The label space forms a lattice, and 
two labels are related by a “dominates” relation.  Typically enforced during login, a 
supporting policy ensures that the subjects acting on behalf of the users have labels that 
are dominated by the user’s clearance.  A user with a secret clearance can run the same 
program as a subject labeled secret or as a subject labeled unclassified, assuming the 
program is labeled unclassified. Even though both the subjects run the same program on 
behalf of the same user, they obtain different privileges due to their security labels.  This 
thesis addresses the security of subjects and objects, and the modeling of the supporting 
policy is left for future work.   
Mandatory access BLP rules can be expressed as follows, with SecLabel 
representing the security label of the indicated subject or object: 
• Simple security property: Subject s can read object o only if SecLabel(s) 
dominates SecLabel(o) 
• *-property: Subject s can write object o only if SecLabel(o) dominates 
SecLabel(s). 
                                                 
1 Integrity policy is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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2. Specware Model  
a. Required Library 
The Specware General library version 4.2.5 is imported to support on the 
Set and Monad types as shown in Figure 55.  
  
 import /Library/General 
 
Figure 55 Importing Specifications from General Library 
b. Type Description 
For this example, we declare classification labels of Top Secret, Secret, 
Confidential and Unclassified to represent SecLabel, which is typically how 
confidentiality levels are defined in the military world. In Figure 56, a Resource is 
declared to have a name and a label.   Both Subject and Object are of the type Resource.  
The Mode represents the type of access.   
  
 %% Defining 4 types of security labels 
 type SecLabel = | TS_label | S_label | C_label | U_label 
 
 %% Resource Related Types 
 type ResourceName = String 
 type Resource = {name: ResourceName, label: SecLabel} 
 type Subject = Resource 
 type Object = Resource 
 
 %% Access Mode 
 type Mode = | Read | Write 
 
Figure 56 Security Label, Access Mode and Resource type Declarations 
c. Transactions 
Next, two transform types are defined, as shown in Figure 57, which 
represent the primary security mechanisms of the BLP model.  The first, MakeKnown, 
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adds a mode of access, expressed in the form of an AccessTuple, for a subject to an 
object while the second, Terminate, removes a mode of access for a subject to an object.   
  
 %% Current Access Transform Type & Access Tuple 
 type ATTransaction = | MakeKnown | Terminate  
 type AccessTuple = Subject * Object * Mode 
 
Figure 57 Declaration of Access Tuple and Transform Type 
d. Input 
The Input to a transformation is declared in terms of the AccessTuple and 
ATTransaction as shown in Figure 58.   
  
 %% Input Types 
 type Input = AccessTuple * ATTransaction 
 type InputList = List Input 
 
Figure 58 Declaration of Input Type 
e. State 
The SystemState represents the current modes of access of Subjects to 
Objects.  A StateMonad is defined for the SystemState along with the corresponding 
return and monadBind functions as shown in Figure 59. 
 
 %% State and StateMonad  
 type State = Set AccessTuple 
 type SystemState = State 
 type StateMonad a = SystemState -> a * SystemState 
 
 %% Monad return and bind functions 
 op [a] return (x:a): StateMonad a = fn st -> (x, st) 
 op [a,b] monadBind (m1: StateMonad a, f: a -> StateMonad b): 
  StateMonad b =  
   fn st -> let (y,st1) = m1 st in  
    f y st1 
 
Figure 59 Declaration of State Related Types, State Monad and associated functions 
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SecLabel is defined in a LinearOrder.  The operation dominates, in Figure 
60, defines the Linear Ordering, with Top Secret Label dominating Secret, Secret 
dominating Confidential and Confidential dominating Unclassified.  The dominance 
relationship is transitive as a result of linear ordering.  For example, TS_label dominates 
C_label in this case, due to the fact that the TS_label dominating S_label which 
dominates C_label.  
  
 %% dominates function - a security label dominates another 
 %% which is of equal or lower classification 
 op dominates : LinearOrder SecLabel = 
  the (dominates) dominates(TS_label, S_label) 
          && dominates(S_label, C_label) 
          && dominates(C_label, U_label) 
 
Figure 60 Definition of dominates operation 
f. Security Property 
Predicates on Sets are used to assess if an access or a state is secure.  An 
access tuple is secure only if the label of the subject dominates that of the object for the 
case when the access mode is Read, and vice versa for the case when the access mode is 
Write. Since this expresses essentially the set of all possible secure tuples, we can express 
a Secure State as one which is a subset of this as illustrated in the securestate? predicate 
defined in Figure 61.  Helper functions for the Current Access are also defined as shown 










 %% Checks if a subject can access an object using a  
 %% specified access mode based on BLP rules 
 op access_secure? : AccessTuple -> Boolean 
 def access_secure? (subject, object, access_mode) = 
  case access_mode of  
  | Read -> 
   dominates (subject.label, object.label) 
  | Write -> 
   dominates (object.label, subject.label) 
  
 op securestate?(S: State): Boolean = 
  S <= access_secure? 
 
 op property?: (State) -> Boolean 
 def property?(s) = securestate?(s) 
 
Figure 61 Definition of security predicates to check security property 
 
 
 %% Auxillary Functions for Current Access to check if contains 
 %% a tuple;  Also for adding and removing tuples from Current  
 %% Access Table 
 op currently_accessible?(at: AccessTuple): StateMonad Boolean = 
  fn (S: State) -> (at in? S, S) 
 
 op addAccess(at: AccessTuple): StateMonad () = 
  fn (S: State) -> ((), S <| at) 
 
 op removeAccess(at: AccessTuple): StateMonad () = 
  fn (S: State) -> ((), S - at) 
 
Figure 62 Definition of manipulators of Current Access 
g. State Transition/Transformation 
Figure 63 specifies the possible state transformations.  As discussed 
above, two transform types are defined.  The first, MakeKnown, adds a mode of access, 
expressed in the form of an AccessTuple, for a subject to an object while the second, 
Terminate, removes a mode of access for a subject to an object.  evalProgram takes in a 






 %% This corresponds to the main function performing the statement 
 %% It will read in the next statement, perform it and then call 
next 
 op transition: Input -> StateMonad Boolean 
 def transition(at, input_transaction) = 
  case input_transaction of 
   | MakeKnown -> { 
     curr? <- currently_accessed? at; 
     if ~curr? && access_secure? at 
     then { 
      addAccess at; 
      return true 
     } else  
      return false 
    }                     
    | Terminate -> { 
     curr? <- currently_accessed? at; 
     if curr? 
     then { 
      removeAccess at; 
          return true 
     } 
        else return false 
    } 
  
 op evalProgram: InputList -> StateMonad(List Boolean) 
 def evalProgram (inputs) = 
   case inputs of 
    | [] -> return [] 
    | inp::r_inputs -> { 
      r1 <- transition inp; 
      res <- evalProgram r_inputs; 
      return(r1::res) 
     } 
 
Figure 63 State Transition 
h. Theorems 
Simply put, the theorem in Figure 64 just means that the empty state is 
secure.  Empty state refers to the state where the current access is empty, i.e., the state 






 %% theorem stating that an empty Current Access Matrix  
 %% is a secure state 
 theorem EmptySecure is 
  securestate?(empty)  
  
Figure 64 Theorem Empty is Secure 
Two supportive theorems (Figure 65) have been added to facilitate the 
eventual proving by Isabelle.  One states that if the current attempted access is secure, it 
will be added to the set of access tuples which make up the Current Access.  It should be 
noted that this holds true for the case when the current attempted access is already in the 
current access set.  In this special case, the result of adding the current access to the set 
will remain as S.  In the case where the current access is not secure, it is not added to the 
Current Access set.  
  
 %% Theorem stating change of state after a MakeKnown transform type. 
 %% state will be a subset of the original state 
 theorem transition_MakeKnown_secure is 
  fa(S: State, S': State, at: AccessTuple) 
   access_secure? at => (transition (at,MakeKnown) S).2 = S <| at 
 
 theorem transition_MakeKnown_not_secure is 
  fa(S: State, S': State, at: AccessTuple) 
   ~(access_secure? at) => (transition (at,MakeKnown) S).2 = S 
 
Figure 65 Sub-theorems for MakeKnown 
A similar theorem is formulated for the Terminate transaction as shown in 
Figure 66.  For this case, terminate involves removal of a tuple from the current access 
set if it exists.  As such, the resultant State should be a subset of the original State. 
 
 %% Theorem stating change of state after a terminate transform 
 %% type. New state will be a subset of the original state 
 theorem transition_Terminate_subset_eq is 
  fa(S: State, S': State, at: AccessTuple) 
   (transition (at,Terminate) S).2 <= S 
  
Figure 66 Sub-theorem for Terminate 
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Next, the theorem transition_state_secure is formulated as in Figure 67.  
This theorem states that given an initial secure state, for any input, the state transited to 
will be secure based on the defined transition operation. 
  
 %% Theorem stating change of state is secure 
 theorem transition_state_secure is 
  fa(S: State, input:Input) 
   securestate?(S) => securestate?((transition input S).2) 
  
Figure 67 Theorem Transition State Secure 
It should not be difficult then to conclude that given an initial empty state, 
which is secure by the theorem EmptySecure, the system state will always be secure as a 
direct result from transition_state_secure. 
i. Proving in Isabelle 
During the session at Kestrel, the specification was translated to the 
Isabelle language and Kestrel provided examples of how to use the Isabelle theorem 
prover.  The proof steps are performed using the Isabelle graphical interface, as described 
above, which can later by copied into the Specware specification itself to facilitate re-
proof.  From this experience, we learned that interactive theorem proving is an intense 
effort that requires detailed knowledge of both the target specification’s logic and the 
proof system — our BLP model and the Isabelle theorem prover, in this case.  One 
example, to establish that the dominates operation is a linear ordering, was not completed 
due to time limitations of the visit, but illustrated how different specification styles, as 
well as proof strategies, can effect the elegance of the proof.   
3. Discussion and Lessons Learned 
Many of the lessons learned in the building of this submodel have been 
documented and discussed in the previous section.  The most important takeaway was 
that the proving on Isabelle platform is not trivial, and would take more than just simple 
predicate and theorem proofing knowledge and basic understanding of Isabelle to 
complete the proof.  Experience would be another key asset, as we saw how the Kestrel 
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team brilliantly guided Isabelle across many of the proof obligations.  The team realized 
that it would not be possible to amass such technical expertise and experience within the 
time constraint of our project.  Focus will be placed instead on completing the modeling 
of LPSK.  
F. MODELING LPSK IN SPECWARE 
1. Model Description 
A separation kernel refers to hardware and/or firmware and/or software 
mechanisms whose primary function is to establish, isolate and separate multiple 
partitions and control information flow between the subjects and exported resources 
allocated to these partitions.  The goal of the separation kernel is to virtualize and allocate 
shared resources such that each partition encompasses a resource set that appears to be 
isolated from the rest.   
The Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) is a foundational element in the design of 
high assurance systems.  In the context of computing, it requires that every module (a 
process, a user or a program) must be able to access only such information and resources 
that are necessary for the purpose it is built for.  It allows for the confinement of damage 
when corruption of components occur and as the privileges afforded each component will 
be minimal, security analysis of the TOE Security Functions (TSF) is less complex.  TSF 
is consequently more evaluable and accountable. 
The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) 
created the Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project to illustrate how trusted 
computing systems and components can be constructed.  The project is developing a high 
assurance, Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) with a hosted trusted application as 
a reference implementation for trusted computing. 
The paper “A Least Privilege Model for Static Separation Kernels” [12] describes 
a core Formal Security Policy Model of a separation kernel that enforces the Principle of 
Least Privilege.  Previous students from NPS have specified elements of similar models 
using PVS [1], Specware [2] and Alloy specification languages [3]. DeCloss’s model, in 
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particular, was created using an earlier version of Specware (version 4.1.3).   In his paper, 
as part of the scope for future work, he suggested the use of Monads to represent state in 
Specware and enhancement of the model he built in his thesis to include requirements for 
the TCX LPSK, such as incorporating a notion of initialization of the policy tables within 
the model and the modeling of a trusted partial ordering on the flows between blocks for 
the identification of “trusted subjects.”   
The team proceeded to build a model of the TCX LPSK using monadic state 
representation and transition based on the security model which that has been created in 
the preceding experiments.  Flows between subjects and objects are modeled as state 
changes.  The implementation is performed using the latest release of Specware (version 
4.2.5) which was made available to us after the visit to Kestrel in November 2008.  This 
version incorporated the new Set Base Library which we found to be useful in the 
representation of relationships among the various entities in the model.   
2. Specware Model 
a. Resource and Block Type 
Resources are defined to be the totality of all hardware, firmware and 
software and data that are executed, utilized, created, protected or exported by the 
separation kernel[12]. 
Resources can further be subtyped into exported resources and internal 
resources.  Exported resources (ResourceExt) refer to resources (including subjects) 
which can be explicitly referenced via the separation kernel interface.  Conversely, 
internal resources (ResourceInt) are those which are only available to the kernel and to 
which explicit reference is not possible.  The predicates exported?, notexported?, active? 
and trusted? are declared to define which resource is exported, internal, active and trusted 





 op exported?: Resource -> Boolean 
 op notexported?: Resource -> Boolean 
 op active?: Resource -> Boolean 
 op trusted?: Resource -> Boolean 
 
 type ResourceExt = Resource | exported? 
 type ResourceInt = Resource | notexported?  
  
Figure 68 Resource Types and Properties 
An active resource ResourceActive is an external resource which is active 
and initiates operations on a passive resource.  Examples of active entities of a system 
include a program, a process or an agent.  In our model, the type Subject is used to 
represent such an entity in the separation kernel.   
  
 type ResourceActive = ResourceExt | active? 
 type Subject = ResourceActive 
 type TrustedSubject = Subject | trusted? 
 
Figure 69 Declaration of ResoureActive, Subject and TrustedSubject 
A trusted subject (TrustedSubject) is next defined in Figure 69 to be a 
subject that is allowed to perform operations not normally allowed for ordinary subjects 
by policy.  The concept of trusted subject being allowed to but not required to violate 
partial ordering is used in the discussion on Partial Ordering and Total Partial Ordering 
later. 
The terms RSet, ReSet, RiSet and RsSet are declared next as shown in 
Figure 70 to represent the sets of Resource, ResourceExt, ResourceInt and Subject in a 
system respectively. 
 
 %% Set of resource 
 type RSet = Set Resource 
 type ReSet = Set ResourceExt %%Set of exported resources 
 type RiSet = Set ResourceInt  %%Set of internal resources 
 type RsSet = Set Subject  %%Set of subjects 
 
Figure 70 Declaration of Resource Sets 
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The set of ResourceExt elements is partitioned into blocks which also 
constitute equivalence classes.  Every ResourceExt element in the specification is 
assigned exactly one and only one Block element.  Subjects and other exported resources 
are allocated to blocks by the separation kernel.  Conversely, each block defined must 
have at least a resource allocated to it as an empty block would not be useful.  This is 
described by the axiom BlockNotEmpty in Figure 71.  BSet is declared to be the set of all 
blocks defined for a particular system.   
  
 %% Partitioning of resources into blocks 
 type Block = Set ResourceExt 
 
 %% set of blocks 
 type BSet = Set Block 
 
 %% Each block must have at least one resource allocated to  
 %% it since an empty block is useless and invalid 
 axiom BlockNotEmpty is 
  fa (blk: Block) nonEmpty?(blk) 
  
 
Figure 71 Declaration of Block and BSet 
A Block is defined to be a set of exported Resources as shown in Figure 
72.  All the resources inside a Block have the same BlockId as described by the axiom 
BlockResourceSameBlockId.  All Blocks in a system are distinct sets which do not 
overlap.  Any ResourceExt in the system must reside within a Block.  Consequently, the 
summation of all Resources inside all defined Blocks should equal that of the entire 
exported resource set, considering that no ResourceExt is defined outside a Block.  This is 
shown pictorially in Figure 72 and Figure 73, and is specified by the property propertyRB 
axiom in Figure 74. 
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Figure 72 Blocks of Resources 












 %% All of the resources of a given Block type have the same blkId 
 axiom BlockResourceSameBlockId is 
  fa (blk: Block, resrc1: ResourceExt, resrc2: ResourceExt) 
   resrc1 in? blk && resrc2 in? blk 
    => resrc1.blkid = resrc2.blkid 
 
 %% returns true if all blocks in a given BSet are distinct and do 
 %% not overlap 
 op distinctSets(bset: BSet) : Boolean = 
  fa(b1: Block, b2: Block) 
   b1 in? bset  
   &&  
   b2 in? bset  
   && 
    (b1 /\ b2 = empty 
    ||  
    b1 = b2) 
 
 %% System element axiom 
 %% Union of the resources of all blocks equals the resource set 
 %% No other resource exists other than those is sys.resources 
 %% Blocks of sys.resources are distinct 
 
 axiom propertyRB is 
  fa (sys: System) 
   (\\// (sys.blocks) = sys.sysstate.resrcset /\ (fn (i) ->  
    exported?(i))) 
   &&  
   (full? sys.sysstate.resrcset) 
   &&  
   distinctSets(sys.blocks)  
 
 
Figure 74 Property of Block 
In our model, a Resource object is defined as in Figure 75 by a unique Resource 
ID, a block identifier (BlockId) that identifies the block the resource belongs to and the 
memory, essentially a set of bits, assigned to the resource.  The memory attribute will be 






 type ResourceId = String 
 
 %% Identifier for block 
 type BlockId  
 
 %% Resource 
 type Resource = {rscid: ResourceId, blkid: BlockId,  
                    rscmem: ResourceMemory} 
 
Figure 75 Declaration of a Resource 
A Block is defined to be just strictly a set of Resources without adding an 
explicit BlockID as an attribute.  This is to conform to the mathematical notion of a block 
in a partition, facilitates comparison and allows set operations between a Block and the 
Resource set.  As a result of this definition, a number of helper operations have to be 
defined to retrieve a Block based on its BlockId and also to retrieve the BlockId from a 
given Block.  The operations getBlock and getBlockId used in performing these respective 
functionalities are implemented as below in Figure 76.  Given the set of exported 
resources ReSet and the partition of those resources B, the function RB retrieves the block 
id from a specified ResourceExt object.  Note that these operations could have just been 
left as abstract functions but the team furnished their implementations to make the model 
as complete as possible.  In the specification, the team was, however, hampered by the 
non-availability of documentation for the newly released Set Base Library and the lack of 
helper functions for this Library to iterate and extract Set elements for manipulation.  The 
resultant implementation consequently looks cumbersome as only the onlyMember 
operation was available at the team’s disposal to retrieve a member from a set which is a 
Singleton.  Although axioms could be and have been defined to ensure that such sets are 
Singleton, we are still left with the ugly “if-then-else”construct in the functions as 









 Block Manpulation Operations 




 op blockMatchBlockId : Block * BlockId -> Boolean 
 def blockMatchBlockId (blk, blkId) = 
  fa (resrc: ResourceExt) resrc in? blk => resrc.blkid = blkId 
 
 %% Retrieving the blocks of given block-set that match a given  
 %% blockid 
 op filterBlock (blockset : BSet, blkId : BlockId) : BSet =  
   blockset /\ (fn i -> blockMatchBlockId(i, blkId))  
 
 %% Retrieve the block from a given block-set that match a given  
 %% blockid 
 op getBlock (blockset : BSet, blkId : BlockId) : RSet = 
  let bset = filterBlock(blockset, blkId) in 
  if single? bset 
  then 
   theMember bset 
  else 
   empty 
 
 %% Return the ID of a given block 
 op getBlockId: Block -> BlockId 
  def getBlockId(blk) = 
  let idset = map (fn i -> i.blkid) blk in 
  theMember idset 
 
 %% Return the block id of a given resource  
 op RB : ResourceExt -> BlockId 
 def RB(res) = res.blkid 
 
Figure 76 Definition of Block and related operations 
b. Flow 
Next, the notion of a flow is introduced in Figure 77 after declaring the 
various types of resources and blocks.  A flow is declared as a tuple of Subject, 
ResourceExt and FlowModeSet.  Only two modes of flow (ModeOfFlow), Read and 
Write, will be considered in our simplified model, ignoring a possible execute mode 
presented in the paper [12]. The FlowModeSet attribute specifies the modes of flow under 
consideration from the source which is a Subject to the destination which is a 
ResourceExt.  Since it is represented as a set, it is not required to define a NULL type and 
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a RW (read write) type as what DeCloss has done in his model.  An empty FlowModeSet 
will indicate no flow and a set containing both Read and Write modes of flow will be 
equivalent to the RW representation in DeCloss’s model.   Our description does not 
exclude the possibility that the destination is another Subject.  A Transform is a collection 
of Flow tuples.  Each operation, as used in the paper, is associated with a Transform 
object which represents the resultant flows of an invocation.  The function MM represents 
all the flows between pairs of resources which will be actualized by the system 
operations.  It is declared in our model as a set of Transforms as it is the cumulative 
collection of all actualized flows from system operations. 
  
 %% Flow related 
 type ModeOfFlow = | Read | Write  
 type FlowModeSet = Set ModeOfFlow 
 
 %% Flow effect & Set of all possible flow effects 
 type Flow = {subj: Subject, obj: ResourceExt, fset: FlowModeSet} 
 
 %% Defines all effects associated with an operation/transform 
 type Transform = Set Flow 
 type MM = Set Transform  
 
 
Figure 77 Definiton of Flow, FlowEffect, Transform and MM 
A flow policy defining the least privilege flow control between Subject 
and ResourceExt and the block-to-block flow control between Blocks will be defined next.  
The two flow policies are orthogonal, i.e., a flow allowed in one may not necessarily be 
allowed in the other policy.   The Policy object is defined to be made up of two matrices 
as shown in Figure 78. 
 
 %% Policy is preset and passed in during initialisation 
 type Policy = {srm:SRMatrix, bbm: BBMatrix} 
 
Figure 78 Definition of Policy 
The least privilege flow control is defined by a subject-resource matrix 
(SRMatrix) which contains a collection of flow tuples depicting allowed flows between a 
Subject and a ResourceExt defining the least privilege flow policy.  The function SR as 
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shown in Figure 79 extracts out from the SRMatrix the tuple corresponding to the Subject 
and ResourceExt specified.  Each SRMatrix should contain at most one flow tuple  
corresponding to each Subject and ResourceExt pair as ensured by the axiom 
SRSingleEntrySubjObjPair.  If the tuple is not found in the SRMatrix, it is assumed that 
no flow is allowed between that Subject and ResourceExt pair.  This is equivalent to an 




  Subject to Resource Policy and Flows 




 %% Subject to Resource flow record 
 type SRMatrix = Set Flow 
 
 %% returns the modes of flow allowed between a given subject and  
 %% resource in a given SRmatrix 
 op SR(pol: SRMatrix, subj: Subject, extobj: ResourceExt) :  
   FlowModeSet = 
  let bset = pol /\ (fn i -> (i.subj = subj) &&  
   (i.obj = extobj)) in 
  case single? bset of  
   | true -> (theMember bset).fset 
   | false -> empty 
 
  axiom SRSingleEntrySubjObjPair is 
    fa (pol: SRMatrix, subj: Subject, extobj: ResourceExt) 
      let bset = pol /\ (fn i -> (i.subj = subj) &&  
   (i.obj = extobj)) in 
   single? bset || empty? bset 
 
Figure 79 Definition of SRMatrix 
Block-to-block flow control policy is defined by the BBMatrix in Figure 
80.  BBMatrix contains a set of BBRecord tuples which specify the set of flow modes 
allowed between a source block and a destination block.  The operation BB locates the 
BBRecord inside the BBMatrix for a specified pair of source and destination and returns 
the set of allowed flows from the source to the destination.  For any defined Block a, a 





 %% Block to Block flow record 
 %% Represents flow of information between blocks 
 %% BBMatrix contains tuples depicting a Set of FlowModes 
 %% between 2 blocks.  If a BBRecord linking 2 blocks is not 
 %% found, no allowable flow is allowed source is b1, dest is b2 
 type BBRecord = {b1: Block, b2: Block, fset: FlowModeSet} 
 type BBMatrix = Set BBRecord 
 
 (*******************************************************************
  Block to block Policy and Flows 
  Check is based on the policy matrix specified  
 *******************************************************************)
  
 %% Retrieve allowed flows modes from block a to block b from  
 %% given policy matrix 
 op BB(bb: BBMatrix, a: BlockId, b: BlockId) : FlowModeSet = 
  let bset = bb /\  
   (fn i -> (getBlockId(i.b1)=a && getBlockId(i.b2)=b)) in 
  case single? bset of  
   | true -> (theMember bset).fset 
   | false -> empty 
 
 %% No other blocks exist other than those in sys.blocks 
 %% All blocks can both read and write to themselves   
 axiom BB_FLOWS_BLOCK_INTERNAL_ALLOWED is 
  fa (sys: System, a: Block) 
   let bid = getBlockId(a) in  
   full? sys.blocks && 
    Write in? BB(sys.pol.bbm, bid, bid) && 
    Read in? BB(sys.pol.bbm, bid, bid)  
 
Figure 80 Definition of BB  
On completion of the discussion on flow and flow policy, we are now 
ready to describe what a system is.  In the LPSK paper, the following elements are used 
to define a System following a least privilege separation model:  
• a set of resources RSet 
• a set of operations O (this translates to Transform in our model) 
• a set of modes of flow FlowModeSet 
• a partitioning of resources into a set of blocks BSet 
• an operation-to-effects function MM 
• a block-to-block flow function BB 
• a subject-to-resource flow function SR 
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A system can thus be represented as = (RSet, Transform, FlowModeSet, BSet, MM, BB, 
SR).  In our model, it is recognized that the FlowModeSet has already been defined in the 
model under type specification.  A complete description of a System will need to include 
both its static and dynamic elements.  Under static elements, BSet has to be specified to 
define how the resources are assigned to blocks and MM to define the actualized 
Transform in the system.  BB and SR have to be furnished at system initialization in the 
form of a Policy object containing the BBMatrix and a SRMatrix.   The two matrices are 
initialized during system startup and remain static thereafter.  For dynamic element, the 
system state, State, is defined.  This contains the flows that are currently enabled for the 
subjects and also the set of system resources (RSet). System resources are included under 
State as the memory attribute (ResourceMemory) of Resource may change with state 
transition.  Figure 81 shows the definition of System and State types. 
 
  
 type System = {blocks: BSet, systemflows: MM, pol: Policy,  
  sysstate: State} 
 
 %% State contains the flows that are currently enabled for 
subjects,  
 %% and also the set of system resources  
 type State = {atset: Set Flow, resrcset: RSet} 
 
Figure 81 Definition of System and State 
Figure 82 shows the relationship of the primary model elements of the system.  Flow is a 
central model component and is used in State in the definition of the accesses that are 
enabled, in Transform to represent data flow that have been actualized and in the Policy 
object to define allowed data flows.   
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Figure 82 System Components and their Relationships 
c. System State 
The set of resources defined under State can be divided into a set of 
exported resources and a set of internal resources.  The sets, RiSet and ReSet are distinct 
and do not overlap as depicted by the set relation in Figure 83.   
 
 axiom propertySystemSetResource is 
   fa(sys: System) 
   let intres = sys.sysstate.resrcset /\  
    (fn (i) -> notexported? (i)) in 
   let exres = sys.sysstate.resrcset /\  
    (fn (i) -> exported? (i)) in   
   (intres \/ exres = sys.sysstate.resrcset) && 
    (intres /\ exres = empty)  
 
Figure 83 Property of Resource Set 
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It was defined earlier in Figure 75 that every resource has resource 
memory (ResourceMemory).  The ResourceMemory is defined to be a set of bits.  
Potentially, the set could also be empty if the resource is not loaded by the kernel or no 
memory has been assigned to the resource.  For the model, the case where there is no 
overlap of memory between resources, as defined by propertyResourceMemoryDistinct, 
is assumed. 
  
 %% Memory related 
 type Bit 
 type ResourceMemory = Set Bit 
 type Memory = Set Bit 
 
  axiom propertyResourceMemoryDistinct is 
  fa (resrc1: Resource, resrc2: Resource) 
    (resrc1.rscmem /\ resrc2.rscmem) = empty || resrc1 = resrc2   
  
Figure 84 Definition of Memory 
To analyze how state changes will transition inside our model, the system 
state needs to be defined.  For the purpose of our model, a system state is defined to 
consist of a set of access tuples and a set of resources (RSet) as in Figure 85.  As already 
mentioned, State represents the components of the system that can change.  An access 
tuple represents a request to the kernel for access to a system resource.  It is expressed in 
the form of a Flow object.  The kernel arbitrates every access attempt and determines if 
an access is allowed based on the transaction type (ATTTransaction) defined in Figure 85 
and the policy of the system.  Four transaction types have been defined for the model.  
Each transaction potentially causes some change in the system state.  ReadExternal and 
WriteExternal in particular may result in a flow in the system. The read_op and write_op 
are abstract operations but they invoke flows which result in changes in the subject and 
accessed object’s memories respectively.  Changes in the memory of subject and object 






 type ATTransaction = | MakeKnown | Terminate | ReadResourceExt  
  | WriteResourceExt 
  
Figure 85 Different types defined in ATTTransaction 
d. State Monads 
The State Monad is declared as in the previous model for BLP.  Additional 
State Monads are defined in Figure 86 to access and change the state variables, namely 
atset and resrcset.  The function currently_accessible? checks to see if a particular access 
has already been granted by the system through a prior MakeKnown transaction type call.  
add_access adds and enables an access atset while remove_access removes all tuples and 
accessses associated with the subject and object specified which have been previously 
enabled from atset.  The operations read_op and write_op are invoked via 
ReadResourceExt and WriteResourceExt transaction type calls respectively only when 
the specified input Flow is enabled.   
 
 (*******************************************************************
 State Monad Definition 
 *******************************************************************)
  
 type StateMonad a = State -> a * State 
 op [a] return (x:a): StateMonad a = fn st -> (x, st) 
 op [a,b] monadBind (m1: StateMonad a, f: a -> StateMonad b):  
   StateMonad b = 
  fn st -> let (y,st1) = m1 st in 
   f y st1 
 
 (*******************************************************************
  System state functions. 
  State Monads for accessing and changing the state variables 
 *******************************************************************)
 
 op get_access_by_at (at: Flow): StateMonad (Set Flow) = 
  fn (S: State) -> (S.atset /\ (fn i -> ((i.subj = at.subj) && 
      (i.obj = at.obj))), S)  
  
 %% Access Functions to retrieve and set values inside states 
 op currently_accessible?(at: Flow): StateMonad  Boolean = 
 { 
     curr <- get_access_by_at at; 
     return ((single? curr) && (at.fset <= (theMember (curr)).fset)) 
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 } 
   
 op add_access(at: Flow): StateMonad () = 
 { 
   curr <- get_access_by_at (at); 
   if (single? curr) 
   then  
      { 
    remove_access (at); 
    curr_at <- get_current_access; 
    put_current_access (curr_at <|  
     { 
     subj = at.subj,  
           obj = at.obj,  
     fset = (theMember (curr)).fset \/ at.fset 
     } 
    ); 
    return () 
   } 
   else 
    return ()                 
 }        
     
 op remove_access(at: Flow): StateMonad () = 
  fn (S: State) ->  
   ((), {atset = S.atset -- (fn i -> (i.subj = at.subj) &&  
   (i.obj = at.obj)), resrcset = S.resrcset}) 
 
 op get_current_access: StateMonad (Set Flow) = 
   fn (S: State) -> (S.atset, S) 
 
 op put_current_access(inatset: Set Flow): StateMonad () = 
   fn (S: State) -> ((), {atset = inatset, resrcset = S.resrcset}) 
     
 op read_op: Subject * ResourceExt -> StateMonad () 
 op write_op: Subject * ResourceExt -> StateMonad ()  
 
 op get_resource: StateMonad (RSet) = 
  fn (S: State) -> (S.resrcset, S) 
 
 op get_resource_memory: Resource -> StateMonad (Set Bit) 
Figure 86 State Monads for state access and modification 
e. Security Predicates 
To evaluate the security of the state and its transitions, security predicates 
as shown in Figure 87 are defined to check the security of accesses and the security 
properties of the system.  access_allowed? checks to see if a subject can access an  
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external resource with the mode specified based on system policy.  access_secure? 
encapsulates the access_allowed?, providing a check on whether an access is allowed 
based on an input access tuple.   
 
 op access_allowed?: SRMatrix * BBMatrix * Subject * ResourceExt * 
  FlowModeSet -> Boolean 
 def access_allowed? (srm, bbm, subject, object, am) = 
  am <= (SR(srm, subject, object)) && 
  am <= (BB(bbm, subject.blkid, object.blkid)) 
 
 op access_secure? : SRMatrix * BBMatrix * Flow -> Boolean 
 def access_secure? (srm, bbm, {subj = subject, obj = object, 
   fset = am}) = 
  access_allowed?(srm, bbm, subject, object, am)  
 
 
Figure 87 Security predicates 
The transition operation, which transits the state based on an Input object 
and the system policy, is next defined.  The Input object is made of two attributes, an 
AccessTuple detailing the subject, object and flow mode requested, and an 
ATTransaction flag indicating the type of transaction sought by the caller.  More detail of 
the different ATTransaction types and their effects on the state are given in Table 3.  The 




Make Known Making a request for access as described by the specified 
AccessTuple.  An entry is added to the AccessTuple table if the 
access is allowed by policy and the access tuple is not currently 
present in the set of AccessTuples in system state.  Accesses have 
to be made known before ReadExternal and WriteExternal 
operations may be made.   
Terminate Making a request to terminate all accesses as specified by the 
AccessTuple.  The mod field is ignored and all accesses related to 
the subj and obj specified are removed 
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Read External Making a request for the subj to read the obj specified.  The mod 
field is ignored and we define that some state change has occurred 
if a change in the subj memory results from the read_op,  
Effectively, a flow has occurred from the obj to the subj. 
Write External Making a request for the subj to read the obj specified.  The mod 
field is ignored and we define that some state change has occurred 
if a change in the obj memory results from the write_op,  
Effectively, a flow has occurred from the subj to the obj. 
Table 3.   Transaction types supported in model 
 
   
 
 type Input = {at: Flow, attran: ATTransaction} 
 
 op transition: Input * System -> StateMonad Boolean 
 def transition(inp, sys) = 
    let policy = sys.pol in 
  let at = inp.at in 
  let inputtran = inp.attran in 
 
  case inputtran of 
 
   | MakeKnown -> 
    {  
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
     if ~curr? && access_secure?(policy.srm, policy.bbm, at) 
     then { 
      add_access at; 
      return true 
     } 
     else return false 
    } 
   | Terminate -> 
    { 
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
      if curr? 
     then { 
      remove_access at; 
      return true 
     } 
     else return false 
    } 
     
   | ReadResourceExt -> 
    {  
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
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     if curr? 
     then { 
      b4resourceMem <- get_resource_memory(at.subj);  
      read_op(at.subj, at.obj); 
      afterresourceMem <- get_resource_memory(at.subj);        
      return ( 
       ex (memsect: Set Bit) 
        ~(memsect <= b4resourceMem) 
        && 
        (memsect <= at.obj.rscmem) 
        &&                                                 
        (memsect <= afterresourceMem)  
      ) 
     } 
     else return false 
    } 
 
   | WriteResourceExt ->                              
    {  
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
     if curr? 
     then { 
      b4objMem <- get_resource_memory(at.obj);  
      write_op(at.subj, at.obj); 
      afterobjMem <- get_resource_memory(at.obj);           
      return ( 
       ex (memsect: Set Bit) 
        ~(memsect <= b4objMem) 
        && 
        (memsect <= at.subj.rscmem) 
        && 
        (memsect <= afterobjMem)   
      ) 
     } 
     else return false 
    } 
Figure 88 Definition of transition operation 
f. Security Theorems 
In Figure 89, the top level encapsulating operation which initializes the 
system and furnishes an input list is defined.  This may be useful in formulating general 
theorems involving an arbitrary number of inputs, e.g., an InputList of arbitrary length 
and results in the state resulting from the InputList transition, and a list of Boolean results 




 type InputList = List Input 
 
 op evalProgram: InputList * System -> StateMonad(List Boolean) 
 def evalProgram (inputs, sys) = 
  case inputs of 
   | [] -> return [] 
   | inp::r_inputs -> 
    { 
     r1 <- transition (inp, sys); 
      res <- evalProgram (r_inputs, sys); 
      return(r1::res) 
    } 
 
 
Figure 89 Encapsulating function 
A few theorems of our model, some corresponding to those defined 
previously for the BLP example, can now be formulated.  
The first operation in Figure 90, secure_write_transition, states that an 
invocation of write_op will result in a change in the object memory.  The actualization of 
the flow from the Subject to the object (ResourceExt) implies that the flow is currently 
enabled.  Correspondingly, the secure_read transition states that an invocation of 
read_op will result in a change in the Subject memory.  In this case, the occurrence of the 
flow from the object to the Subject implies that the flow is enabled; i.e., the flow is 
present inside the access tuple set at the point of invocation of read_op.  These two 
operations are essential as they define that a flow actualized by a State change must be 
one that is enabled for a system to be secure.  
The securestate? predicate checks to see if the state of the system is secure 
based on the contents of the access tuple set.  A state is defined as secure if all the 
elements of the access tuple set satisfy access_secure? 
The theorem EmptySecure describes that a system state whereby the 
access tuple set is empty is secure.  The StateMonad currently_accessible? predicate will 
always return a false for all invocations and no flow will result based on our defined 
model.   
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The next theorem, SecureSystem, states three properties for a System to be 
secure.  Firstly, if the current state is secure, a transition will result in the next state also 
being secure.  Also, an actualization of a flow in the system due to a read or write 
operation for a particular system state implies that the flow is enabled for that system 
state. From the two theorems, we would also be able to deduce that starting from an 




 op secure_write_transition(S1: State, at: Flow): Boolean =  
  if (Write in? at.fset) then  
   let S' = (write_op (at.subj, at.obj) S1).2 in 
   ((get_resource_memory (at.obj) S1).1 ~=  
    (get_resource_memory (at.obj) S').1) => 
    (currently_accessible? at S1).1 
  else 
   false 
      
 op secure_read_transition(S1: State, at: Flow): Boolean =  
  if (Read in? at.fset) then 
   let S' = (read_op (at.subj, at.obj) S1).2 in 
   ((get_resource_memory (at.subj) S1).1 ~=  
    (get_resource_memory (at.subj) S').1) => 
    (currently_accessible? at S1).1 
  else 
   false 
 
 op securestate?(S: State, policy: Policy): Boolean = 
  fa(at: Flow) at in? S.atset 
   => access_secure?(policy.srm, policy.bbm, at) 
    
 theorem EmptySecure is 
  fa(sys: System) 
   sys.sysstate.atset = empty &&  
    securestate?(sys.sysstate, sys.pol)  
 
 theorem SecureSystem is 
  fa(S: State, input:Input, sys: System) 
   securestate?(S, sys.pol) 
   => securestate?((transition (input, sys) S).2, sys.pol) 
   && 
   secure_write_transition(S, input.at) 
   && 
   secure_read_transition(S, input.at) 
 
Figure 90 Security Theorems for secure state 
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g. Partial Ordering and Trusted Partial Ordering 
Figure 91 shows our attempt to specify the Partial Ordering of the inter block 
flows defined by BB.  Partial Ordering is a relation defined on a set, having the properties that 
each element is reflective, the relation is transitive, and if two elements are in relation to each 
other, the two elements are equal (antisymmetric).  The Partial Ordering of BB ensures that 
information is not allowed to flow circularly among the blocks in the relationship, i.e., if 
information leaves a block there is no transitive flow that will lead the information back to the 
block.  direct_flow_to is defined as a helper function to restrict flow consideration to only those 
direct flows between the two blocks under consideration. 
   
 (*******************************************************************
  
  Partial Ordering of BB 
  Semantics to describe flows between blocks to be defined in such a 
  way that information is not allowed to flow circularly, i.e. if 
  information leaves a block, there is no transitive flow that will  
  lead back to itself.  Important to note that any 2 blocks are not  
  required to be related by a flow.   
  
 *******************************************************************)
 op direct_flow_to?(bb: BBMatrix, a: BlockId, b: BlockId) : Boolean =
  Write in? BB(bb, a, b)   %% a -> b, caused by a 
  || 
  Read in? BB(bb, b, a)   %% a -> b, caused by b 
 
 op PO(blkset: BSet, bb: BBMatrix): Boolean = 
  fa (i: Block, j: Block, k: Block) 
   (i in? blkset) && (j in? blkset) && (k in? blkset) => 
 
    %% Refective Property 
     direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(i), getBlockId(i)) 
    && 
    %% Antisymmetric 
    ( 
     (direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(i), getBlockId(j)) 
     && 
     direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(j), getBlockId(i)) 
     ) => (i = j) 
    ) && 
    %% Transitive 
    ( 
     (direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(i), getBlockId(j)) 
     && 
     direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(j), getBlockId(k)) 
     ) => direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(i), getBlockId(k)) 
    ) 
Figure 91 Definition of Partial Ordering 
 79
The Partial Ordering is employed in the subsequent specification of 
Trusted Paired Ordering for the system.  The notion of a trusted subject, defined at the 
beginning of this specification example, is used here.  A trusted subject has been defined 
as one that is trusted not to downgrade information other what is intended for 
downgrading.  Given a partial ordering for B, called  Bbase, a trusted partial ordering for 
the system is defined as in Figure 93  Bcontra is a subset of BB containing flows in 
contradiction to those identified in Bbase.  The operation derivebbflowset in Figure 92 
derives the set of flows from the BBRecords inside the BBMatrix.  This is needed for 
comparison with the systemflows set. 
 
  %% BBMatrix contains a set of BBRecord record{block, block, flowset} 
  %% We would like to extract out the allowed flows from this, bearing 
  %% in mind that a flow is a tuple consisting of a 
  %% {subject, object, fmode} 
 op derivebbflowset(bbm: BBMatrix): Set Flow = 
  let setsetflow = map (bb2flowset) bbm in 
  \\// setsetflow 
 
 op bb2flowset(bb: BBRecord): Set Flow = 
  let b1subject = bb.b1 /\ (fn i -> active?(i)) in 
  let b2object = bb.b2 in 
  let bbduple = b1subject * b2object in 
  map (fn (a,b) -> {subj = a, obj = b, fset = bb.fset}) bbduple 
 





 Trusted Partial Ordering of BB 
 Bbase: Trusted partial ordering for system 
 
 Trusted Subject is a Subject that has undergone rigorous analysis & 
 is trusted not to downgrade information other than the information 
 it is intended to downgrade.   
 
 He is allowed but not required to violate the partial ordering.   
 Flows will exist in the System that will violate the partial  
 ordering. (bcontra) 
   
 *******************************************************************)
 
 theorem TPO is 
  fa(sys: System, bbase: BBMatrix)  
   ex (blkset: BSet, bcontra: Set BBRecord)  
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    %% System Transform flows will be totality of bbase & 
bcontra 
    %% Note that transform flows are a set of flows while 
BBRecord 
    %% depicts a flow from a block to another block  
    %% derivebbflowset extracts all possible subject to resource 
    %% flow  
     
    \\//sys.systemflows = derivebbflowset(bbase \/ bcontra)  
     && 
    PO(blkset, bbase) &&  
     
    ( 
     fa (rs: Resource, r: Resource, f: Set ModeOfFlow) 
      
      %% Flow must be allowed in bcontra but not bbase 
      f <= BB(bcontra, RB(rs), RB(r)) && 
       
      %% Flow must be allowed in SR 
      f <= SR((sys.pol).srm, rs, r) && 
       
      %% Upon adding the equivalence of the flow from rs to r, 
      %% partial ordering no longer holds for the block set 
and 
      %% new bbase 
      ~( 
       PO( 
        blkset, (bbase <| {b1 = getBlock(sys.blocks, 
RB(rs)),  
         b2 = getBlock(sys.blocks, RB(r)), fset = f}) 
       ) 
      )  
       
      %% rs must be a trusted subject 
      => (exported?(rs) && active?(rs) && trusted?(rs)) 
    )  
  
Figure 93 Definition of Trusted Partial Ordering 
3. Discussion and Lessons Learned 
Building of the LPSK model specification started only after our visit to Kestrel in 
late October 2008.  The Kestrel team recommended the use of the Specware Set Base 
Library instead of the List Base Library which the team had, along with DeCloss [2] in a 
previous project, thus far depended upon.  The Set Base Library was introduced only in 
the latest version of Specware (version 4.2.5), which was officially released in November 
2008.  As this library is new, we analyzed the Set specification itself to learn about the 
inbuilt operations and their uses.  Unlike the List Base Library which comes with a set of 
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utility functions for transversal and manipulation, the Set Library does not provide many 
support functions. For example, the Member function is the only retrieval operation 
available and it works on a Singleton set, i.e., a set containing only a single element.  A 
conscious effort had been made in the model to use sets as much as possible, as it is most 
natural and appropriate for the LPSK model where sets of resources and associated 
properties are considered.  The team recognizes that some of the expressions in our 
model appear overly cumbersome and suspect that there may be better and more concise 
ways to represent them.  The refinement of the specification has been left as a potential 
scope of later work, when proper documentation and practical examples of the Specware 
Set Base Library are made available. 
Readers should note that the team has chosen to go down the track of just 
modeling flows related to exported resources.  Flow effects have been specified only in 
terms of the flows between subjects (RsSet) and exported resources (ReSet).  For 
example, flow has been declared as a tuple of subject, exported resource and a set of flow 
mode.  For the model to be more complete, e.g., with respect to noninterfernace, 
additional axioms and properties may have to be defined to ensure separation policy 
regarding internal resources.  Due to time constraints, this is not covered in this thesis.  
An alternative approach would be to conduct a comprehensive covert channel analysis of 
the system and specifications to provide the evidence for separation of internal resources.   
In the modeling, the team has not attempted to build an abstract model and a final 
target model as has been performed by DeCloss [2].  Morphism is supported and is a 
strong feature in Specware and it may be useful if the team first develops a canonical 
abstract security model which is refined only in its subsequent target model.  This will 
allow the reuse of the specification for other models and also allow modellers to focus on 
only the areas they want to focus on at the point of modeling.   
For our current model, additional suggested follow up specification work includes 
specification of semantics of read_op and write_op which currently are abstract 
operations which result in changes in the subject and object memory respectively.   It is 
also important to note that the use of “if-then-else” (Figure 94) constructs in our model, 
particularly in the transition operation may make subsequent refinement attempts more 
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difficult.  It would be convenient if it can be replaced with a chained predicate construct 
(Figure 95) prevalent in functional programming.  The team briefly investigated how to 
replace the construct as c is a Monadic State Transition function that returns a 
StateMonad Boolean rather than just a Boolean, and the completion of this effort was left 
for future work.  
 
 
if (a && b) then c 
 
Figure 94 “if-then-else” construct 
 
 
a && b && c 
 
Figure 95 Chained predicate construct 
For the model to be useful, additional work is needed to verify it, discharge its 
proof obligations and attempt proving them using a tool like Isabelle in order to prove the 
security properties related to the model.  Subsequently, execution codes may also be 
generated directly from the model.  It is important to note, though, that the use of Set may 
potentially hamper the translation to execution code as sets may be infinite.  When such 
refinement to executable code is desired, ‘FiniteSet’ should be used in the specification in 
place of ‘Set.’ 
Specware does not support the declaration of model-level variables and 
parameters, unlike other specification languages like Prototype Verification System 
(PVS). As a result, for every defined axiom or theorem, operation level parameters have 
to be redeclared and used, making the specifications more cumbersome and less flexible. 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
It is demonstrated in this thesis that the translation from Specware to Isabelle can 
be seamlessly achieved using the Specware to Isabelle Translator. The team has also 
completed the building of a LPSK model using Monads and the Set base library released 
in Specware version 4.2.5.   Results and recommendations pertaining to the different 
areas of exploration are summarised below. 
A. SPECWARE 
MetaSlang in Specware is a rich language for specifying the security model, but 
the available documentation is not sufficient for a beginner to achieve functional 
programming; in particular, more examples are needed. To help beginners to smoothen 
the learning curve for Specware we recommend that the Specware Language manual [26] 
include more exhaustive examples of how each of the Mestaslang constructs can be used, 
and that the tutorial documentation include more sample specifications in Specware.  
Also, documentation built-in and examples for the new Set base library should be 
included.   
The current version of Specware for Linux does the support the use of x-symbols, 
as x-symbols have some conflicts with the version of XEmacs used. X-symbols are useful 
when writing the specification as they greatly enhance the readability of the specification. 
Email support from the Kestrel Institute on Specware has been responsive but is 
currently provided by a single person at Kestrel.   A discussion group or forum would be 
extremely useful for one who is just learning the language.  It would promote a more 
proactive and interactive learning environment and provide a learning ground for 
beginners to learn from each other and to share their learning experiences.   
B. ISABELLE 
While SNARK is an automatic theorem prover, Isabelle is an interactive theorem 
prover with automatic proving capability, where the user needs to have substantial 
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knowledge and experience in logical calculus to complete a proof. Although Isabelle 
provides a very extensive list of documentation, most of the documentation assumes a 
strong background and experience in proof logic. An introductory guide with illustrated 
examples on how proving strategies and how proving may be guided interactively in 
Isabelle would be most useful for beginners.  Auto proving in Isabelle succeeds only for 
simple and trivial theorems, as experienced by the team.  Proving becomes more manual 
when the theorems become more complicated.  Subtheorems could be added as 
intermediaries for guiding the proofs.   
Isabelle has a large user group with two mailing lists, a user mailing list and a 
developer mailing list. The mailing lists will be useful for beginners to post questions, 
and learn from developers and fellow users.  It is noted, though, that answers are 
provided only out of goodwill and it is not guaranteed that responses will be received 
upon posting of questions to the forum.  Still, it will be extremely useful for beginners to 
learn from past queries posted by others. 
C. SPECWARE TO ISABELLE TRANSLATION 
Although Specware to Isabelle translation is considered as an initial experimental 
release [20], it provides an almost seamless translation from Specware specification to 
Isabelle specification using the Specware to Isabelle interface. It is recognized that it is 
still work in progress and rare instances exist where the convertor may turn out Isabelle 
syntax which is not accepted by Isabelle.  The team has reported a few such encounters to 
Kestrel and many, such as the one involing the use of “case-of” construct, have been 
resolved in Specware version 4.2.5.  A number of these may not be implementation bugs 
but rather design and implementation decisions by Kestrel but were undocumented. 
When the problems are encountered with proving in Isabelle, first the cause of the 
problem must be determined, e.g., whether it is caused by an inadequacy in the 
translation tool or that the proof demands more input from the user.  This is a time-
consuming process for users with limited knowledge about the intrinsics in the translation 
and the syntax of the Isabelle language.   
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D. SETTING UP OF SPECWARE/ISABELLE DEVELOPMENT 
ENVIRONMENT 
Specware and Isabelle, together with the Specware Isabelle Interface, currently 
are not supported on Windows.  The development environment for the project was set up 
on a Fedora 8 platform running as a VMWare virtual machine on a Windows Vista 
machine.  Glitches were encountered during the setup and valuable time was spent 
getting the software to work.  To make the process as painless as possible for new users, 
we have furnished detailed documentation on the setup process in this report.  The setup 
was done using Specware 4.2.2 and Isabelle 2008 version.  The Graphical User Interface 
also appears slightly unstable and incessant refreshing resulting in blinking of windows 
was occassionally encountered.  Specware and Isabelle can alternatively be run on Mac 
OS environment but this is not explored in the project.  It is also possible to run Isabelle 
on Windows using Cygwin. 
E. SETS 
The newly released Set library provides a convenient and more natural way for 
modeling set relations and collections as compared to the use of List.  In the LPSK 
model, the team used the Set library extensively to model the key model components and 
their relationships. Resource, Block, policy matrices (BBMatrix and SRMatrix) and the 
access matrix (AccessTuple) are implemented as sets in our model.  Set predicates are 
employed in many of the axioms and theorems formulated. Appropriateness and 
correctness of use of the Set Library inside our model could be verified when 
accompanying documentation and examples become available.     
F. MONADS 
Monads allow the embedment of an imperative programming element into 
functional programming code but it does not seem to simplify the proving process on 
Isabelle.  The concept of Monads is not easily grasped and not much supporting 
documentation exists in the Specware user manual.  The team was able to learn to use 
Monads from the visit to Kestrel and the many available Haskell resources on the web 
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and from building simple examples, emulating the Haskell ones widely available on the 
web.  Monads are successfully used in the LPSK to model flows between subjects and 
objects.  
G. LPSK 
The team successfully modeled the notions of state changes and data flows in the 
LPSK model.  Compared to Decloss’s model, the model is more concrete and this is 
possible with the use of Set notation and Monads.  The notion of flow is central to the 
model and is used to represent requests made, the access table and also the actualized 
data flows between resources. 
The system is modeled such that all accesses to systems are arbitrated requests 
made in the form of transactions.  The system maintains an access table and grants 
accesses based on the defined system policy.  Transactions are divided into two groups, 
those that change the access table and those that change the memory of the resources.  
With the above defined, the team formulated security theorems regarding 
transactions and actualized flows.  Readers should note that operations are not restricted 
to the two representative ones, ReadResourceExt and WriteResoruceExt, currently 
handled by our model.  The notion of a secure state is coined based on the existing 
system state at a point in time.  A Transaction would result in state changes, and hence it 
is necessary to ensure that a transaction always brings a secure state to another secure 
state.  This is ensured if the flow associated with the Transaction is allowed and enabled 
by the system.   Conversely, the team also successfully depicted in the model that if a 
flow occurs for a system state, it must be because the flow has been enabled in the access 
table in that particular state. 
Consequently, the concept of a SecureSystem is straightforward.  It is defined as a 




VI. CONCLUSION  
A. CONCLUSION 
In the course of this thesis work, the team attempted to come to terms with Formal 
Methods (FM) tools starting from a minimal mathematical background and knowledge 
about these tools.  Given the state of FM tools today, the learning curve is complex and 
intellectually steep but momentum picks up after negotiating the first few slopes.  The 
team was lucky to be exposed to both the model checking (e.g., refutation as in Alloy 
Analyzer) and theorem proving (as in Specware and theorem prover like PVS and 
Isabelle) to appreciate both types of FM.  The team’s work, however, was very much 
limited to security modeling and code verification using Specware and Isabelle.   There is 
a great deal more to be learned in this area.   
The main challenges encountered by the team include coping with the 
mathematics and proving logic and paradigm shift between imperative programming and 
functional programming, the limited documentation and examples on Specware and the 
overwhelming load of documentation and details in Isabelle where we struggled to locate 
the logical starting point.   However, as this was a team effort, and even though we were 
far from being twice as productive, we learned and tackled the frequent problems 
encountered together. 
We found that with a translator to Isabelle, Specware has become more complete 
as a verification tool. The XEmacs environment that integrates both Specware and 
Isabelle is simple, allowing the developer to become familiar and comfortable with both 
Specware and Isabelle in a relatively short period of time, which is an improvement over 
the earlier version of Specware that DeCloss used in his thesis [2]. 
MetaSlang, the specification language in Specware, is a simple and expressive 
language. MetaSlang can represent state transition either as a history list that can be 
processed recursively or as a state Monad. The representation of Monads in MetaSlang is 
very similar to Haskell, a popular functional programming language, and therefore should 
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be easily understandable by someone that is familiar with functional programming. 
However, for a beginner it requires a substantial amount of effort to understand and use 
them. We have documented our understanding of Monads in this thesis in hopes of 
smoothing the learning curve for Monads.  
It was found that the translation between Specware and Isabelle is almost 
seamless and that there is much potential in the use of Isabelle/HOL to discharge proof 
obligations that arise in developing Specware specifications. The actual proving using 
Isabelle requires substantial knowledge and experience in logical calculus, which put 
closed results outside the scope of this thesis. 
In conclusion, through our work in this thesis we found that Specware, together 
with Isabelle, has great potential for specifying and verifying a security model. They will 
be great tools for experienced user in the theorem proving field.  We hope that the 
illustrated use of Sets and Monads in our LPSK example will also be useful to future 
users of Specware.   
B. FUTURE WORKS 
1. Proving of the Model Using Isabelle 
Isabelle is an interactive theorem prover with lots of capabilities that had yet to be 
explored in this thesis. Further studies may be performed to understand the various 
approaches in theorem proving using Isabelle and the pros and cons of each approach. 
With the understanding of each theorem proving approach, a complete proof for the 
LPSK model could be explored. 
2. Segregation of the Model into an Abstract Canonical Model and a 
Refined Model 
No conscious effort has been put in when specifying the LPSK model to first 
create an abstract model which is subsequently refined.  Work could be done to segregate 
a reusable canonical abstract model from the current specification.   Refinements to the 
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model can also be supported with Specware’s morphism features to specify a concrete 
level representative of the LPSK API and functional behaviour. 
3. Code Generation from a Verified Model using Specware 
Code generation is one of the capabilities of Specware. It is known that infinite 
sets could not be converted to code using the code generation functionality of Specware. 
Research can be conducted to understand the process of code generation and generate an 
executable code from a verified model. 
4. Running Specware/Isabelle on Alternative Platforms 
Running Specware and Isabelle on alternative platforms like MacOS and 
Windows may be further explored as it will eliminate our current dependancy on Fedora.   
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APPENDIX A. GCD EXAMPLE 
A. HASKELL EXAMPLE2 [19] 
A short example shows how the StateTrans Monad let you code in a fairly 
imperative style.  We will implement a variation on Euclid's algorithm for finding the 
greatest common divisor (GCD) of two positive integers as shown in Figure 96. 
  
 while x != y 
 do 
  if x < y 
  then 
   y := y-x 
   else 
   x := x-y 
     return x 
 
Figure 96 Euclid’s Algorithm for calculating GCD 
First we must define a type to represent the state as in Figure 97. 
  
 type ImpState = (Int, Int) 
 
Figure 97 Declaration of State 
Next we define some simple state transformers (Figure 98) to access and change 
the state. We use the type () and its sole value, (), when a state transformer does not 
return a useful value. 
  
 getX, getY :: StateTrans ImpState Int 
 getX = ST(\(x,y)-> ((x,y), x)) 
 getY = ST(\(x,y)-> ((x,y), y)) 
 putX, putY :: Int -> StateTrans ImpState () 
 putX x' = ST(\(x,y)->((x',y),())) 
 putY y' = ST(\(x,y)->((x,y'),())) 
 
Figure 98 State Transformers for accessing and changing the State 
                                                 
2 This example is reproduced from an internet tutorial [19], with some changes in wording.  
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 gcdST :: StateTrans ImpState Int 
 gcdST =  
 do  
  x <- getX 
  y <- getY 
  ( 
   if x == y 
   then 
    return x 
   else  
    if x < y 
    then  
    do 
     putY (y-x) 
     gcdST 
    else 
    do 
     putX (x-y) 
     gcdST 
 ) 
 
Figure 99 Haskell Specification 
And finally, a function to construct an initial state, run the program and discard 
the final state as shown in Figure 100. 
  
 greatestCommonDivisor x y = snd( applyST gcdST (x,y) ) 
 
Figure 100 Encapsulating GCD function 
This small example only hints at the utility of Monads. It would be much shorter 
to write the algorithm in a conventional functional style. For one thing, Monads provide 
access to global state and the savings from not having to explicitly pass the state around 
become larger as the program itself becomes larger. 
B. CORRESPONDING EXAMPLE IN SPECWARE 




 %% Contains the current values of the 2 inputs to 
 %% calculate gcd on 
 type GCDState = Nat * Nat 
 
Figure 101 Declaration of GCDState 
A StateMonad is defined and the template specifications supplied by the Kestrel 
Institute are used as shown in Figure 102 below. 
  
 %% StateMonad defined based on the GCDState with corresponding  
 %% monadic return and bind functions 
 type StateMonad a = GCDState -> a * GCDState 
 op [a] return (x:a): StateMonad a = fn st -> (x, st) 
 op [a,b] monadBind (m1: StateMonad a, f: a->StateMonad b): 
StateMonad b =  
  fn st -> let (y,st1) = m1 st in  
    f y st1 
 
Figure 102 Declaration of Monads and Monadic Function 
State Monadic functions are defined to retrieve both X and Y, and also to update 
X and Y as shown in Figure 103. 
  
 %% Retrieving X and Y value   
 op getX : StateMonad Nat 
 def getX = (fn (x,y) -> (x, (x,y))) 
 op getY : StateMonad Nat 
 def getY = (fn (x,y) -> (y, (x,y))) 
 
 %% Updating X and Y values 
 op putX : Nat -> StateMonad () 
 def putX(input) = (fn (x,y) -> ((), (input,y))) 
 op putY : Nat -> StateMonad () 
 def putY(input) = (fn (x,y) -> ((), (x,input))) 
 
Figure 103 X and Y Manipulators 
Finally, the gcdST core function, which does recursive calculation of the greatest 
common divisor, is defined in Figure 104.  Note that the sequenced calculations are 




%% State Transition function gcdST which calculate and update the 
%% values of X and Y 
 op gcdST: StateMonad Nat  
 def gcdST = {  
  x <- getX; 
  y <- getY; 
  if (x = y)  
  then 
    %% Passing back the final result   
   return x 
  else  
    %% Recursive call if x and y not equal 
   if (x < y) 
   then { 
    putY (y-x); 
       gcdST 
     } else { 
    putX (x-y); 
       gcdST 
     } 
 } 
 
Figure 104 State Transition Function gcdST 
Finally, the encapsulating operation for top level invocation is defined as shown 
in Figure 105.  This allows us to furnish an initial state and applies it recursively to obtain 
the result.  The greatestCommonDivisor further encapsulates the applyST by furnishing 
the initial state in terms of its individual components. 
  
 %% Encapsulating operation invoked with initial state 
 op applyST : StateMonad Nat -> GCDState -> Nat * GCDState 
 def applyST (fnsm) (initstate) = fnsm(initstate)  
  
 %% Top level Encapsulating operation with 2 input numbers to 
 %% calculate gcd on 
 op greatestCommonDivisor: Nat * Nat -> Nat 
 def greatestCommonDivisor (x,y) = (applyST gcdST (x,y)).1 
 
Figure 105 Encapsulating Function and Initialization 
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APPENDIX B. BLP *-PROPERTY MODEL 
A. TYPEDEFSPEC.SW 
%% This specification contains all the type declaration required 
%% by the BLP *-property specification 
 
TypeDef = spec 
 
 %% Initial type declaration 
 type Name = String 
 type Value = Integer 
 type Index = Nat 
 type ProgCounter = Nat 
 
 type Label = | High | Low 
 
 %% Variable declaration 
 type Variable = Name * Value * Label 
 
 type Variables = List Variable 
 
 %% Input declaration 
 type Input = (List Value) * Index 
 
 %% Statement declaration 
 %% assign1 - variable name = variable name, eg a = b 
 %% assign2 - variable name = value, eg a = 5 
 type TypeOfStmt = | ReadLow | ReadHigh | WriteLow | WriteHigh | 
Assign1 | Assign2 | Ifthen1 | Stop 
 
 %% Left-hand part 
 type LHP = Name 
 
 %% Right-hand part 
 type RHP = | VarName String | VarValue Integer  
 
 %% used to indicate the index for next statement to execute 
 %% normally first ProgCounter is used. 
 %% but when conditional statement like if-then-else is used 
 %% the first ProgCounter is for positive evaluation in if and 
 %% the second ProgCounter is for the negative evaluation in else 
 type NextProgCounter = ProgCounter * ProgCounter 
 
 %% Statement declaration 
 type Stmt = Name * TypeOfStmt * LHP * RHP * NextProgCounter 
 
 %% Program declaration 
 type Program = (List Stmt) * ProgCounter 
 
 %% Memory State declaration - Variables, Low Input, High Input 
 type MemoryState = Variables * Input * Input 
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 %% System state declaration - Variable, Low Input, High Input, 
Program 




%% This specification contains all the functions required for 
%% manipulation of Memory state (variable, high input and low input) 
MyMemory = spec  
 %% Memory State contains of 3 components 
 %% (1) Variables: List of Variable 
 %%   Variable: Tuple with 2 fields 
 %%     Name[String] : Name of Field 
 %%     Value[Integer] : Value of Field 
 %% (2) InputLow: List of Low Values. 
 %%   Value[Integer] : Value of Low Input 
 %%   Index[Integer] : Points to next low input to read  
 %% (3) InputHigh: List of High Values. 
 %%   Value[Integer] : Value of High Input 
 %%   Index[Integer] : Points to next high input to read  
 
 
 import TypeDefSpec#TypeDef 
 type MemoryStateValueTuple = MemoryState * Value 
 
 %% Axion #1: Input List Index <= length input list  
 axiom len_input_list is 
  fa (mem_state: MemoryState) 
   let inputLow = mem_state.2 in 
    let inputHigh = mem_state.3 in 
     inputLow.2 < length(inputLow.1) && inputHigh.2 < 
length(inputHigh.1) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% Read from the low input  list based on the current index 
 op read_inputLow : MemoryState -> Integer 
 def read_inputLow(mem_state) =  
  nth(mem_state.2.1, mem_state.2.2) 
 proof Isa [simp]  
  using len_input_list 
  apply(auto) 
 end-proof 
 
 %% Read from the high input  list based on the current index 
 op read_inputHigh : MemoryState -> Integer 
 def read_inputHigh(mem_state) =  
  nth(mem_state.3.1, mem_state.3.2) 
 proof Isa [simp]  
  using len_input_list 




 %% Read from the low input list based on the current index 
 %% Increment Index 
 %% Returns the value read 
 op read_low : MemoryState -> MemoryStateValueTuple 
 def read_low (mem_state) = 
  let read_value = read_inputLow(mem_state) in 
   let updated_input_stream = (mem_state.2.1, succ(mem_state.2.2)) 
in 
    let updated_memory = (mem_state.1, updated_input_stream, 
mem_state.3) in 
     (updated_memory, read_value) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% Read from the high input list based on the current index 
 %% Increment Index 
 %% Returns the value read 
 op read_high : MemoryState -> MemoryStateValueTuple 
 def read_high (mem_state) = 
  let read_value = read_inputHigh(mem_state) in 
   let updated_input_stream = (mem_state.3.1, succ(mem_state.3.2)) 
in 
    let updated_memory = (mem_state.1, mem_state.2, 
updated_input_stream) in 
     (updated_memory, read_value) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 
 %% Find the variable from the variable list  
 %% based on variable name and return the variable 
 op find_variable : Name * MemoryState -> Option Variable 
 def find_variable(var_name, mem_state) = 
  find (fn i -> compare(var_name, i.1) = Equal) (mem_state.1) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% Update the varibale with the new value 
 op update_variable : Name * Value * Label * MemoryState -> 
MemoryState 
 def update_variable(var_name, var_value, var_Label, mem_state) = 
  let new_var = insert((var_name, var_value, var_Label), filter (fn i 
-> compare(var_name, i.1) ~= Equal) (mem_state.1)) in 
   (new_var, mem_state.2, mem_state.3)  




%% This Specification contains all the functions 
%% that are required by the BLP *-property model 
%% to execute the different type of statements 
Statement = spec 
 
 import MemorySpec#MyMemory 
 
 % GT - Greater than 
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 % LT - Less than 
 % GE - Greater or Equal 
 % LE - Less than or Equal 
 % EQ - Equal 
 % NEQ - Not Equal 
 type Cond = | GT | LT | GE | LE | EQ | NEQ 
 
 %% function to read from low input and assign to variable specified 
by LHP 
 op read_low_func : LHP * MemoryState -> MemoryState 
 def read_low_func (var_name, mem_state) = 
  let read_value = (read_low(mem_state)).2 in 
   update_variable(var_name, read_value, Low, mem_state) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% function to read from high input and assign to variable specified 
by LHP 
 op read_high_func : LHP * MemoryState -> MemoryState 
 def read_high_func (var_name, mem_state) = 
  let read_value = (read_high(mem_state)).2 in 
   update_variable(var_name, read_value, High, mem_state) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% function to assign a value of a variable to a variable (LHP) 
 op assign1_func : LHP * RHP * MemoryState -> MemoryState 
 def assign1_func(l, r, mem_state) = 
  %% find out the value of the variable specified by RHP 
  %% then assign the value to LHP,  
  %% if not variable not found - just do nothing 
   case r of 
    | VarName v -> 
     let x = find_variable(v,mem_state) in 
      case x of  
       | Some var -> update_variable (l, var.2, var.3, 
mem_state) 
       | None -> mem_state 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% function to assign an integer (RHP) to a variable (LHP) 
 op assign2_func : LHP * RHP * MemoryState -> MemoryState 
 def assign2_func(l, r, mem_state) = 
  %% assign the value from RHP to LHP, 
  case r of 
   | VarValue v -> 
   update_variable (l, v, Low, mem_state) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% function to get value from variable name,  
 %% if variable not found, zero will be returned by default 
 op get_var_value : Name * MemoryState -> Value 
 def get_var_value(n,mem_state) = 
  let x = find_variable(n, mem_state) in 
   case x of  
    | Some v -> v.2 
    %%  default to 0 if not found 
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    | None -> 0 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% Evaluate the conditional statement 
 %% This function is not used, can be used in future to expand this 
work 
 %% the if-then-else statement can be represented using case, 
 %% version 4.2.2 has some problem with conversion of case statement  
 %% in some instance, that why if-then=else is use. This issue should 
be 
 %% resolved in version 4.2.5 
 op cond_eval? : LHP * RHP * Cond * MemoryState -> Boolean 
 def cond_eval?(l, r, cond, mem_state) =  
  case r of 
   | VarName v -> 
     let x = get_var_value(l, mem_state) in 
     let y = get_var_value(v,mem_state) in 
      if cond = GT  then 
       x > y 
      else if cond = LT  then    
       x < y 
      else if cond = GE  then 
       x >= y 
      else if cond = LE  then 
       x <= y 
      else if cond = EQ  then 
       x =  y 
      else if cond = NEQ then  
       ~(x =  y) 
      %% default true 
      else true 
   | VarValue v -> 
     let x = get_var_value(l, mem_state) in 
     let y = v in 
     if cond = GT  then 
      x >  y 
     else if cond = LT  then 
      x <  y 
     else if cond = GE  then 
      x >= y 
     else if cond = LE  then 
      x <= y 
     else if cond = EQ  then 
      x =  y 
     else if cond = NEQ then  
      ~(x =  y) 
     %% default true 
     else true 







%% This Specification is where the program initial state and 
%% list of statement is defined 
Init = spec 
 
 import TypeDefSpec#TypeDef 
 
 op initial_state :  SystemState 
 def initial_state : SystemState =  
  %% init Variable 
  ([("x",0, Low), ("y",0, Low)], 
  %% init low input 
  ([2,7,18],0), 
  %% init high input 
  ([4,10,35],0), 
  %% init program 
  ([("s0", Assign2,   "x", VarValue 5,  (1, 1)),  
   ("s1", ReadLow,   "y", VarValue 0,  (2, 2)), 
   ("s2", Assign1,   "x", VarName "y", (3, 3)), 
   ("s3", ReadHigh,  "y", VarValue 0,  (4, 4)), 
   ("s4", WriteHigh, "y", VarValue 0,  (5, 5)), 
   ("s5", WriteHigh, "x", VarValue 0,  (6, 6)), 
    ("s6", Stop,      "" , VarValue 0,  (6, 6))], 
    0)) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
endspec 
E. FILESYSTEMSPEC.SW 
%% This the the main specification file modeling the  
%% the *-property of BLP 
%% This specification will require the following 
%% Specware files: 
%%  - TypeDefSpec.sw 
%%  - StatementSpec.sw 
%%  - InitSpec.sw 
%%  - MemorySpec.sw 
FileSystem = spec 
 
 %% import the required Specware specification 
 import TypeDefSpec#TypeDef 
 import StatementSpec#Statement 
 import InitSpec#Init 
 
 %% system state transition 
 op transition : SystemState -> SystemState 
 def transition (s) =  
  %% as nth will be used, it is required to confirm the length  
  %% of the list before proceeding, else Isabelle 
  if (length s.4.1) > s.4.2 then 
   let vars = s.1 in 
   let inputLow = s.2 in 
   let inputHigh = s.3 in 
   let prog = s.4 in  
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   let stmt = nth (prog.1, prog.2) in 
    %% Handle read low statement 
    if stmt.2 = ReadLow then 
     %% Read from low input and assign to variable specified by 
LHS 
     let new_mem = read_low_func(stmt.3, (vars, inputLow, 
inputHigh)) in 
     %% Update prog state - assign next program counter 
     let new_prog =  (prog.1, stmt.5.1) in 
      (new_mem.1, new_mem.2, new_mem.3, new_prog) 
    %% Handle read high statement 
    else if stmt.2 = ReadHigh then 
     %% Read from high input and assign to variable specified by 
LHS 
     let new_mem = read_high_func(stmt.3, (vars, inputLow, 
inputHigh)) in 
     %% Update prog state - assign next program counter 
     let new_prog =  (prog.1, stmt.5.1) in 
      (new_mem.1, new_mem.2, new_mem.3, new_prog) 
    %% Handle write low statement 
    else if stmt.2 = WriteLow then 
     %% There is no output implemented, so nothing specific to do 
for write 
     %% Update prog state - assign the next program counter 
     let new_prog =  (prog.1, stmt.5.1) in 
      (vars, inputLow, inputHigh, new_prog) 
    %% Handle write high statement 
    else if stmt.2 = WriteHigh then 
     %% There is no output implemented, so nothing specific to do 
for write 
     %% Update prog state - assign the next program counter 
     let new_prog =  (prog.1, stmt.5.1) in 
      (vars, inputLow, inputHigh, new_prog) 
    %% Handle Assign1 (X = Y) statement 
    else if stmt.2 = Assign1 then 
     %% assign RHS to variable specified by LHS 
     let new_mem = assign1_func(stmt.3, stmt.4, (vars, inputLow, 
inputHigh)) in 
     %% Update prog state - increment the program counter 
     let new_prog =  (prog.1, stmt.5.1) in 
      (new_mem.1, new_mem.2, new_mem.3, new_prog) 
    %% Handle Assign2 (X = 5) statement 
    else if stmt.2 = Assign2 then 
     %% assign RHS to variable specified by LHS 
     let new_mem = assign2_func(stmt.3, stmt.4, (vars, inputLow, 
inputHigh)) in 
      %% Update prog state - increment the program counter 
      let new_prog =  (prog.1, stmt.5.1) in 
       (new_mem.1, new_mem.2, new_mem.3, new_prog) 
    %% The Ifthen1 statement was not used, it can be extended in 
future 
    else if stmt.2 = Ifthen1 then 
     %% handle if then else statement 
     let exprval = (cond_eval?(stmt.3, stmt.4, GE, (s.1,s.2, 
s.3))) in 
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     let next_stmt = if exprval then stmt.5.1 else stmt.5.2 in 
     let new_prog = (prog.1, next_stmt) in 
      (vars, inputLow, inputHigh, new_prog) 
    %% Handle stop statement 
    else if stmt.2 = Stop then 
     %% return the current state 
     s 
    else  
     %% by default return the current state for unknown statement 
     s 
  %% by defualt return the current state for unknown statement 
  else s 
 %% with [simp], this def will be added into the list of simplication 
rule for future proofing 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% check the system state for writing high to low (BLP *-property) 
 op property? : SystemState -> Boolean 
 def property?(s) =  
  %% as nth will be used, it is required to confirm the length  
  %% of the list before proceeding, else Isabelle 
  if ((length s.4.1) > s.4.2) then 
   let stmt = nth(s.4.1,s.4.2) in 
    %% will return false only if the statement is writelow 
    %% and the label of the  variable is high 
    if (stmt.2 = WriteLow) && 
      (exists(fn i -> ((i.1 = stmt.3) && (i.3 = High))) (s.1)) 
then 
     false 
    else 
     true 
  else  
   true 
 %% with [simp], this def will be added into the list of simplication 
rule for future proofing 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
 
 %% This function will run n number of line of the program 
 %% The function is of recursive nature, where it will recursively 
 %% call itself until n = 0, and the systemstate will be 
 %% iniitalize to the initial state, subsequently transition 
 %% will happen until the initial n value 
 op evaluate : Nat -> SystemState  
 def evaluate(n) =  
  if n = 0 then  
   initial_state  
  else  
   transition(evaluate(n-1)) 
 %% with [simp], this def will be added into the list of simplication 
rule for future proofing 
 proof Isa  [simp]  end-proof 
 
 %% This function checks whether the program counter is greater than 0 
 op pcProperty? : SystemState -> Boolean 
 def pcProperty?(s) =  
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  if ((length s.4.1) > 0) then 
   true 
  else 
   false  
 %% with [simp], this def will be added into the list of simplication 
rule for future proofing 
 proof Isa  [simp]  end-proof 
 
 %% This trivial theorem will confirm that Prog counter will remain 
greater than 0 
 theorem pc_ok is 
  fa(n : Nat) 
   pcProperty?(evaluate(n)) 
 proof Isa [simp] 
  apply(induct_tac n) 
  apply(auto simp add: Let_def)  
 end-proof 
 
 %% This theorem is evaluate whether the inputted program is secure 
 theorem system_secure is 
  fa(n : Nat) 
   property?(evaluate(n)) 
 %% This proof could not be complete in Isabelle 
 %% It require an more in depth understanding of 
 %% Isabelle 
 proof Isa [simp] 
  apply(induct_tac n) 
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APPENDIX C. BLP MODEL 
A. BLP.SW 
%% Example Implementation of BLP based on simple Monad Example which 
%% we created previously 
 
BLP qualifying spec  
 
 import /Library/General 
  
 type SecLabel = | TS_label | S_label | C_label | U_label 
  
 %% type SecLabel = {i: Nat | i > 0 && i <= 4} 
 type ResourceName = String 
  
 type Resource = {name: ResourceName, label: SecLabel} 
 type Subject = Resource 
 type Object = Resource 
  
 type Mode = | Read | Write 
 type ATTransaction = | MakeKnown | Terminate  %% Open | Close ? 
 type AccessTuple = Subject * Object * Mode 
 type State = Set AccessTuple 
 type Input = AccessTuple * ATTransaction 
 type InputList = List Input 
  
 %% The state consists of just 1 variable 
 %% X: State [List AccessTuple] which contains allowed transitions 
  
 type SystemState = State 
 type StateMonad a = SystemState -> a * SystemState 
  
 op dominates : LinearOrder SecLabel = 
  the (dominates) dominates(TS_label, S_label) 
   && dominates(S_label, C_label) 
   && dominates(C_label, U_label) 
  
 proof Isa BLP__dominates_subtype_constr 
   apply(simp add: BLP__dominates_def) 
   apply(rule_tac Q="Order__linearOrder_p" in the1I2) 
   apply(auto simp add: BLP__dominates_Obligation_the) 
 end-proof 
  
 %% For the state to be secure, all tuples inside the state must 
 %% satisfy the tuple_is_secure property  
 %% Initially the access tuple list is empty    
  
 %% Checks if a subject can access an object using a specified access 
 %% modebased on BLP rules 
 op access_secure? : AccessTuple -> Boolean 
 def access_secure? (subject, object, access_mode) = 
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  case access_mode of  
  | Read -> 
   dominates (subject.label, object.label) 
  | Write -> 
   dominates (object.label, subject.label) 
  
 op securestate?(S: State): Boolean =  
  S <= access_secure? 
  
 %% Checks to see if the tuple specified in inside the current state 
 %% Returns true if tuple exists, false if tuple does not exist) 
  
 op [a] return (x:a): StateMonad a = fn st -> (x, st) 
 op [a,b] monadBind (m1: StateMonad a, f: a -> StateMonad b):  
   StateMonad b =  
   fn st -> let (y,st1) = m1 st in  
   f y st1 
  
 %% Accessory Functions to retrieve and set values inside states 
 op currently_accessible?(at: AccessTuple): StateMonad Boolean = 
  fn (S: State) -> (at in? S, S) 
  
 op addAccess(at: AccessTuple): StateMonad () = 
  fn (S: State) -> ((), S <| at) 
  
 op removeAccess(at: AccessTuple): StateMonad () = 
  fn (S: State) -> ((), S - at) 
  
 %% This corresponds to the main function performing the statement 
 %% It will read in the next statement, perform it and then call next 
 %% monad_transition is a fn State -> Nat*State 
 %% straightforward if property is checking based on the state 
 %% variables 
  
 op property?: (State) -> Boolean 
 def property?(s) = securestate?(s) 
 proof Isa [simp] end-proof 
  
 op transition: Input -> StateMonad Boolean 
 def transition(at, input_transaction) = 
  case input_transaction of 
   | MakeKnown -> 
    { 
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
     if ~curr? && access_secure? at 
     then { 
      addAccess at; 
      return true 
     } 
         else return false 
    }                     
   | Terminate -> 
    { 
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
     if curr? 
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     then { 
      removeAccess at; 
      return true 
     } 
     else return false 
    } 
     
 op evalProgram: InputList -> StateMonad(List Boolean) 
 def evalProgram (inputs) = 
  case inputs of 
   | [] -> return [] 
   | inp::r_inputs -> 
    { 
     r1 <- transition inp; 
     res <- evalProgram r_inputs; 
     return(r1::res) 
    } 
     
 theorem EmptySecure is 
  securestate?(empty)  
 proof Isa by (auto simp add: BLP__securestate_p_def) 
 end-proof 
  
 theorem transition_Terminate_subset_eq is 
  fa(S: State, S': State, at: AccessTuple) 
   (transition (at,Terminate) S).2 <= S 
 proof Isa 
  apply(case_tac "at \_in S") 
  apply(auto simp add: BLP__return_def 
   BLP__monadBind_def 
   BLP__currently_accessible_p_def Let_def 
   BLP__removeAccess_def) 
 end-proof 
  
 theorem transition_MakeKnown_secure is 
  fa(S: State, S': State, at: AccessTuple) 
  access_secure? at => (transition (at,MakeKnown) S).2 = S <| at 
 proof Isa 
  apply(case_tac "at \_notin S \_and 
    BLP__access_secure_p at") 
  apply(auto simp add: BLP__return_def 
    BLP__monadBind_def 
   BLP__currently_accessible_p_def Let_def 
   BLP__addAccess_def) 
 end-proof 
  
 theorem transition_MakeKnown_not_secure is 
   fa(S: State, S': State, at: AccessTuple) 
   ~(access_secure? at) => (transition (at,MakeKnown) S).2 = S 
 proof Isa 
   apply(case_tac "at \_notin S \_and BLP__access_secure_p at") 
   apply(auto simp add: BLP__return_def BLP__monadBind_def 
    BLP__currently_accessible_p_def Let_def 




 theorem transition_state_secure is 
   fa(S: State, input:Input) 
     securestate?(S) => securestate?((transition input S).2) 
 proof Isa 
  proof (cases input) 
   show "\_Anda b. \_lbrakkBLP__securestate_p S; input =  
    (a, b)\_rbrakk \_Longrightarrow BLP__securestate_p  
    (snd (BLP__transition input S))" 
    proof - 
     fix a b 
     assume a1: "BLP__securestate_p S" 
     assume a2: "input = (a, b)" 
     show "BLP__securestate_p (snd (BLP__transition input S))" 
      proof (cases b) 
       case Terminate 
       have "snd(BLP__transition (a,Terminate) S) 
        \_subseteq S" 
        by(rule_tac BLP__transition_Terminate_subset_eq) 
             with `b = Terminate`  `input = (a,b)` 
             have new_in_old: "snd(BLP__transition input S)  
              \_subseteq S" by auto 
             from a1 have "S \_subseteq BLP__access_secure_p" 
              by (auto simp add: BLP__securestate_p_def) 
             with new_in_old have "snd(BLP__transition input S) 
        \_subseteq BLP__access_secure_p" 
        by (rule subset_trans) 
       thus ?thesis by (auto simp add: BLP__securestate_p_def) 
       next 
       case MakeKnown 
       show ?thesis 
        proof (cases "BLP__access_secure_p a") 
         case True 
         thus ?thesis 
          proof - 
           have new_state:  
            "snd(BLP__transition (a,MakeKnown) S) =  
             insert a S" 
            by(rule_tac 
             BLP__transition_MakeKnown_secure) 
            from a1 have S_secure:  
             "S \_subseteq BLP__access_secure_p" 
            by (auto simp add: BLP__securestate_p_def) 
           with new_state a2 `b = MakeKnown` 
            `BLP__access_secure_p a` 
           show ?thesis by (auto simp add:  
            BLP__securestate_p_def mem_def) 
          qed 
         next 
         case False 
         thus ?thesis 
          proof - 
           have new_state: "snd(BLP__transition  
            (a,MakeKnown) S) = S" 
            by(rule_tac 
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             BLP__transition_MakeKnown_not_secure) 
           with a1 
           have "BLP__securestate_p 
            (snd (BLP__transition (a, MakeKnown) S))" 
            by auto 
           with `input = (a, b)` `b = MakeKnown` 
           show ?thesis by auto 
          qed 
        qed 
      qed 
    qed 
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APPENDIX D. LPSK MODEL 
A. LPSK.SW 
 






 Type Definitions 
 
 *******************************************************************) 
 type ResourceId = String 
 
 %% Identifier for block 
 type BlockId 
  
 %% Resource 
 type Resource = {rscid: ResourceId, blkid: BlockId, 
  rscmem: ResourceMemory} 
 
 op exported?: Resource -> Boolean 
 op notexported?: Resource -> Boolean 
 op active?: Resource -> Boolean 
 op trusted?: Resource -> Boolean 
 
 type ResourceExt = Resource | exported? 
 type ResourceInt = Resource | notexported? 
 
 type ResourceActive = ResourceExt | active? 
 type Subject = ResourceActive 
 type TrustedSubject = Subject | trusted? 
 
 %% Set of resource 
 type RSet = Set Resource 
 type ReSet = Set ResourceExt %%Set of exported resources 
 type RiSet = Set ResourceInt %%Set of internal resources 
 type RsSet = Set Subject        %%Set of subjects 
 
 %% Partitioning of resources into blocks 
 %% Block is a set of Resource 
 type Block = Set ResourceExt 
 
 %% set of blocks 
 type BSet = Set Block 
 
 %% Memory related 
 type Bit 
 type ResourceMemory = Set Bit 
 type Memory = Set Bit 
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 %% Flow related 
 type ModeOfFlow = | Read | Write  
 type FlowModeSet = Set ModeOfFlow 
 
 %% Flow effect & Set of all possible flow effects 
 type Flow = {subj: Subject, obj: ResourceExt, fset: FlowModeSet} 
 
 %% Defines all effects associated with an operation/transform 
 type Transform = Set Flow 
 type MM = Set Transform 
 
 type ATTransaction =  
  | MakeKnown | Terminate | ReadResourceExt | WriteResourceExt 
   
 %% Subject to Resource flow record 
 type SRMatrix = Set Flow 
 
 %% Block to Block flow record 
 %% Represents flow of information between blocks 
 %% BBMatrix contains tuples depicting a Set of FlowModes 
 %% between 2 blocks.  If a BBRecord linking 2 blocks is not 
 %% found, no allowable flow is allowed source is b1, dest is b2 
 type BBRecord = {b1: Block, b2: Block, fset: FlowModeSet} 
 type BBMatrix = Set BBRecord 
  
 %% Policy is preset and passed in during initialisation 
 type Policy = {srm:SRMatrix, bbm: BBMatrix} 
 type Input = {at: Flow, attran: ATTransaction} 








 type System = {blocks: BSet, systemflows: MM, pol: Policy,  
  sysstate: State} 
 
 %% State contains the flows that are currently enabled for subjects,  
 %% and also the set of system resources  
 type State = {atset: Set Flow, resrcset: RSet} 
  
 %% Exported resource (Re) \/ Internal resource (Ri) = Resource (R) 
 axiom propertySystemSetResource is 
   fa(sys: System) 
   let intres = sys.sysstate.resrcset /\  
    (fn (i) -> notexported? (i)) in 
   let exres = sys.sysstate.resrcset /\  
    (fn (i) -> exported? (i)) in   
   (intres \/ exres = sys.sysstate.resrcset) && 
    (intres /\ exres = empty) 
          
 (******************************************************************* 
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  axiom propertyResourceMemoryDistinct is 
  fa (resrc1: Resource, resrc2: Resource) 
    (resrc1.rscmem /\ resrc2.rscmem) = empty || resrc1 = resrc2   
   
 (******************************************************************* 
   




 type StateMonad a = State -> a * State 
 op [a] return (x:a): StateMonad a = fn st -> (x, st) 
 op [a,b] monadBind (m1: StateMonad a, f: a -> StateMonad b):  
   StateMonad b = 
  fn st -> let (y,st1) = m1 st in 




 Block Manpulation Operations 




 op blockMatchBlockId : Block * BlockId -> Boolean 
 def blockMatchBlockId (blk, blkId) = 
  fa (resrc: ResourceExt) resrc in? blk => resrc.blkid = blkId 
 
 %% Retrieving the blocks of given block-set that match a given  
 %% blockid 
 op filterBlock (blockset : BSet, blkId : BlockId) : BSet =  
   blockset /\ (fn i -> blockMatchBlockId(i, blkId))  
 
 %% Retrieve the block from a given block-set that match a given  
 %% blockid 
 op getBlock (blockset : BSet, blkId : BlockId) : ReSet = 
  let bset = filterBlock(blockset, blkId) in 
  if single? bset 
  then 
   theMember bset 
  else 
   empty 
 
 %% Return the ID of a given block 
 op getBlockId: Block -> BlockId 
        def getBlockId(blk) = 
  let idset = map (fn i -> i.blkid) blk in 
  theMember idset 
 
 %% Return the block id of a given resource  
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 op RB : ResourceExt -> BlockId 




 Axioms describing property of Block, RB 




 %% all Block types are nonempty 
 axiom BlockNotEmpty is 
  fa (blk: Block) nonEmpty?(blk) 
 
 %% All of the resources of a given Block type have the same blkId 
 axiom BlockResourceSameBlockId is 
  fa (blk: Block, resrc1: ResourceExt, resrc2: ResourceExt) 
   resrc1 in? blk && resrc2 in? blk 
    => resrc1.blkid = resrc2.blkid 
 
 %% returns true if all blocks in a given BSet are distinct and do 
 %% not overlap 
 op distinctSets(bset: BSet) : Boolean = 
  fa(b1: Block, b2: Block) 
   b1 in? bset  
   &&  
   b2 in? bset  
   && 
    (b1 /\ b2 = empty 
    ||  
    b1 = b2) 
 
 %% System element axiom 
 %% Union of the resources of all blocks equals the resource set 
 %% No other resource exists other than those is sys.resources 
 %% Blocks of sys.resources are distinct 
 
 axiom propertyRB is 
  fa(sys: System) 
   (\\// (sys.blocks) = sys.sysstate.resrcset /\ (fn (i) ->  
    exported?(i))) 
   &&  
   (full? sys.sysstate.resrcset) 
   &&  
   distinctSets(sys.blocks) 
    
 (******************************************************************* 
  
  Block to block Policy and Flows 
  Check is based on the policy matrix specified  
   
 *******************************************************************) 
  
 %% Retrieve allowed flows modes from block a to block b from  
 %% given policy matrix 
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 op BB(bb: BBMatrix, a: BlockId, b: BlockId) : FlowModeSet = 
  let bset = bb /\  
   (fn i -> (getBlockId(i.b1)=a && getBlockId(i.b2)=b)) in 
  case single? bset of  
   | true -> (theMember bset).fset 
   | false -> empty 
 
 %% No other blocks exist other than those in sys.blocks 
 %% All blocks can both read and write to themselves   
 axiom BB_FLOWS_BLOCK_INTERNAL_ALLOWED is 
  fa (sys: System, a: Block) 
   let bid = getBlockId(a) in  
   full? sys.blocks && 
    Write in? BB(sys.pol.bbm, bid, bid) && 
    Read in? BB(sys.pol.bbm, bid, bid) 
       
 (******************************************************************* 
  
  Subject to Resource Policy and Flows 
  Check is based on the policy matrix specified  
  
 *******************************************************************) 
 %% returns the modes of flow allowed between a given subject and  
 %% resource in a given SRmatrix 
 op SR(pol: SRMatrix, subj: Subject, extobj: ResourceExt) :  
   FlowModeSet = 
  let bset = pol /\ (fn i -> (i.subj = subj) &&  
   (i.obj = extobj)) in 
  case single? bset of  
   | true -> (theMember bset).fset 
   | false -> empty 
 
  axiom SRSingleEntrySubjObjPair is 
    fa (pol: SRMatrix, subj: Subject, extobj: ResourceExt) 
      let bset = pol /\ (fn i -> (i.subj = subj) &&  
   (i.obj = extobj)) in 
   single? bset || empty? bset 
 
 %% Checks if a specific mode of flow between a given subject and 
 %% resource is in a given Transform 
 op flow_occurs?(t: Transform, f: Flow, m: ModeOfFlow): Boolean = 
  m in? f.fset && 
  f in? t 
  
 op access_allowed?: SRMatrix * BBMatrix * Subject * ResourceExt * 
  FlowModeSet -> Boolean 
 def access_allowed? (srm, bbm, subject, object, am) = 
  am <= (SR(srm, subject, object)) && 
  am <= (BB(bbm, subject.blkid, object.blkid)) 
 
 op access_secure? : SRMatrix * BBMatrix * Flow -> Boolean 
 def access_secure? (srm, bbm, {subj = subject, obj = object, 
   fset = am}) = 





  System state functions. 




 op get_access_by_at (at: Flow): StateMonad (Set Flow) = 
  fn (S: State) -> (S.atset /\ (fn i -> ((i.subj = at.subj) && 
      (i.obj = at.obj))), S)  
  
 %% Access Functions to retrieve and set values inside states 
 op currently_accessible?(at: Flow): StateMonad  Boolean = 
 { 
     curr <- get_access_by_at at; 
     return ((single? curr) && (at.fset <= (theMember (curr)).fset)) 
 } 
   
 op add_access(at: Flow): StateMonad () = 
 { 
   curr <- get_access_by_at (at); 
   if (single? curr) 
   then  
      { 
    remove_access (at); 
    curr_at <- get_current_access; 
    put_current_access (curr_at <|  
     { 
     subj = at.subj,  
          obj = at.obj,  
     fset = (theMember (curr)).fset \/ at.fset 
     } 
    ); 
    return () 
   } 
   else 
    return ()                 
 }        
     
 op remove_access(at: Flow): StateMonad () = 
  fn (S: State) ->  
   ((), {atset = S.atset -- (fn i -> (i.subj = at.subj) &&  
   (i.obj = at.obj)), resrcset = S.resrcset}) 
 
 op get_current_access: StateMonad (Set Flow) = 
   fn (S: State) -> (S.atset, S) 
 
 op put_current_access(inatset: Set Flow): StateMonad () = 
   fn (S: State) -> ((), {atset = inatset, resrcset = S.resrcset}) 
     
 op read_op: Subject * ResourceExt -> StateMonad () 
  op write_op: Subject * ResourceExt -> StateMonad ()  
 
 op get_resource: StateMonad (RSet) = 
  fn (S: State) -> (S.resrcset, S) 
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 op get_resource_memory: Resource -> StateMonad (Set Bit) 
 
 (******************************************************************* 
 Top level execution and initialisation function.   
  Transition function that transits the system state. 
 *******************************************************************) 
 
 op transition: Input * System -> StateMonad Boolean 
 def transition(inp, sys) = 
    let policy = sys.pol in 
  let at = inp.at in 
  let inputtran = inp.attran in 
 
  case inputtran of 
 
   | MakeKnown -> 
    {  
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
     if ~curr? && access_secure?(policy.srm, policy.bbm, at) 
     then { 
      add_access at; 
      return true 
     } 
     else return false 
    } 
   | Terminate -> 
    { 
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
      if curr? 
     then { 
      remove_access at; 
      return true 
     } 
     else return false 
    } 
     
   | ReadResourceExt -> 
    {  
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
     if curr? 
     then { 
      b4resourceMem <- get_resource_memory(at.subj);  
      read_op(at.subj, at.obj); 
      afterresourceMem <- get_resource_memory(at.subj);           
      return ( 
       ex (memsect: Set Bit) 
        ~(memsect <= b4resourceMem) 
        && 
        (memsect <= at.obj.rscmem) 
        &&                                                 
        (memsect <= afterresourceMem)  
      ) 
     } 
     else return false 
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    } 
 
   | WriteResourceExt ->                              
    {  
     curr? <- currently_accessible? at; 
     if curr? 
     then { 
      b4objMem <- get_resource_memory(at.obj);  
      write_op(at.subj, at.obj); 
      afterobjMem <- get_resource_memory(at.obj);           
      return ( 
       ex (memsect: Set Bit) 
        ~(memsect <= b4objMem) 
        && 
        (memsect <= at.subj.rscmem) 
        && 
        (memsect <= afterobjMem)   
      ) 
     } 
     else return false 
    } 
 
 op evalProgram: InputList * System -> StateMonad(List Boolean) 
 def evalProgram (inputs, sys) = 
  case inputs of 
   | [] -> return [] 
   | inp::r_inputs -> 
    {r1 <- transition (inp, sys); 
     res <- evalProgram (r_inputs, sys); 




  Partial Ordering of BB 
  Semantics to describe flows between blocks to be defined in such a  
  way that information is not allowed to flow circularly, i.e. if 
  information leaves a block, there is no transitive flow that will  
  lead back to itself.  Important to note that any 2 blocks are not  




 op direct_flow_to?(bb: BBMatrix, a: BlockId, b: BlockId) : Boolean = 
  Write in? BB(bb, a, b)   %% a -> b, caused by a 
  || 
  Read in? BB(bb, b, a)   %% a -> b, caused by b 
 
 op PO(blkset: BSet, bb: BBMatrix): Boolean = 
  fa (i: Block, j: Block, k: Block) 
   (i in? blkset) && (j in? blkset) && (k in? blkset) => 
 
    %% Refective Property 
     direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(i), getBlockId(i)) 
    && 
    %% Antisymmetric 
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    ( 
     (direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(i), getBlockId(j)) 
     && 
     direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(j), getBlockId(i)) 
     ) => (i = j) 
    ) && 
    %% Transitive 
    ( 
     (direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(i), getBlockId(j)) 
     && 
     direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(j), getBlockId(k)) 
     ) => direct_flow_to?(bb, getBlockId(i), getBlockId(k)) 
    ) 
 
  %% BBMatrix contains a set of BBRecord record{block, block, flowset} 
  %% We would like to extract out the allowed flows from this, bearing  
  %% in mind that a flow is a tuple consisting of a 
  %% {subject, object, fmode} 
 op derivebbflowset(bbm: BBMatrix): Set Flow = 
  let setsetflow = map (bb2flowset) bbm in 
  \\// setsetflow 
 
 op bb2flowset(bb: BBRecord): Set Flow = 
  let b1subject = bb.b1 /\ (fn i -> active?(i)) in 
  let b2object = bb.b2 in 
  let bbduple = b1subject * b2object in 
  map (fn (a,b) -> {subj = a, obj = b, fset = bb.fset}) bbduple 
     
 (******************************************************************* 
  
 Trusted Partial Ordering of BB 
 Bbase: Trusted partial ordering for system 
 
 Trusted Subject is a Subject that has undergone rigorous analysis & 
 is trusted not to downgrade information other than the information 
 it is intended to downgrade.   
 
 He is allowed but not required to violate the partial ordering.   
 Flows will exist in the System that will violate the partial  
 ordering. (bcontra) 
   
 *******************************************************************) 
 
 theorem TPO is 
  fa(sys: System, bbase: BBMatrix)  
   ex (blkset: BSet, bcontra: Set BBRecord)  
    
    %% System Transform flows will be totality of bbase & bcontra 
    %% Note that transform flows are a set of flows while BBRecord 
    %% depicts a flow from a block to another block  
    %% derivebbflowset extracts all possible subject to resource 
    %% flow  
     
    \\//sys.systemflows = derivebbflowset(bbase \/ bcontra)  
     && 
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    PO(blkset, bbase) &&  
     
    ( 
     fa (rs: Resource, r: Resource, f: Set ModeOfFlow) 
      
      %% Flow must be allowed in bcontra but not bbase 
      f <= BB(bcontra, RB(rs), RB(r)) && 
       
      %% Flow must be allowed in SR 
      f <= SR((sys.pol).srm, rs, r) && 
       
      %% Upon adding the equivalence of the flow from rs to r,  
      %% partial ordering no longer holds for the block set and 
      %% new bbase 
      ~( 
       PO( 
        blkset, (bbase <| {b1 = getBlock(sys.blocks, RB(rs)),  
         b2 = getBlock(sys.blocks, RB(r)), fset = f}) 
       ) 
      )  
       
      %% rs must be a trusted subject 
      => (exported?(rs) && active?(rs) && trusted?(rs)) 




  Security Theorems 
   
 *******************************************************************) 
 
 op secure_write_transition(S1: State, at: Flow): Boolean =  
  if (Write in? at.fset) then  
   let S' = (write_op (at.subj, at.obj) S1).2 in 
   ((get_resource_memory (at.obj) S1).1 ~=  
    (get_resource_memory (at.obj) S').1) => 
    (currently_accessible? at S1).1 
  else 
   false 
      
 op secure_read_transition(S1: State, at: Flow): Boolean =  
  if (Read in? at.fset) then 
   let S' = (read_op (at.subj, at.obj) S1).2 in 
   ((get_resource_memory (at.subj) S1).1 ~=  
    (get_resource_memory (at.subj) S').1) => 
    (currently_accessible? at S1).1 
  else 
   false 
 
 op securestate?(S: State, policy: Policy): Boolean = 
  fa(at: Flow) at in? S.atset 
   => access_secure?(policy.srm, policy.bbm, at) 
    
 %% Resource contains a set of bits 
 %% State consists of a policy and a set of resources 
 121
 theorem EmptySecure is 
  fa(sys: System) 
   sys.sysstate.atset = empty &&  
    securestate?(sys.sysstate, sys.pol)  
 
 theorem SecureSystem is 
  fa(S: State, input:Input, sys: System) 
   securestate?(S, sys.pol) 
   => securestate?((transition (input, sys) S).2, sys.pol) 
   && 
   secure_write_transition(S, input.at) 
   && 
   secure_read_transition(S, input.at) 
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